Bifurcation: Two Languages and Two Cultures?*

Samuel Huntington

The continuing growth of Hispanic numbers and influence has led some Hispanic advocates to ser forth two goals. The first is to prevent the assimilation of Hispanics into America's Anglo-Protestant society and culture, and instead create a large, autonomous, permanent, Spanish-speaking, social and cultural Hispanic community on American soil. Advocates, such as William Flores and Rina Benmayor, reject the idea of a "single national community," attack "cultural homogenization," and castigate the effort to promote the use of English as a manifestation of "xenophobia and cultural arrogance." They also attack multiculturalism and pluralism because these concepts relegate "different cultural identities" to "private lives" and assume that "in the public sphere, except in those sanctioned displays of ethnicity, we must put aside those identities and interact instead in a culturally neutral space as 'Americans.'" Hispanics, they argue, should not espouse an American identity but embrace an "emerging Latino identity and polit-

* *In: The Challenges to America's National Identities*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 316-35.

ical and social consciousness." They should claim and are claiming a separate "cultural citizenship" involving "a distinct social space for Latinos in this country."[1]

The second goal of these Hispanic advocates follows from the first. It is to transform America as a whole into a bilingual, bicultural society. America should no longer have the core Anglo-Protestant culture plus the ethnic subcultures that it has had for three centuries. It should have two cultures, Hispanic and Anglo, and, most explicitly, two languages, Spanish and English. A choice must be made "about the future of America," the Duke professor Ariel Dorfman declares: "Will this country speak two languages or merely one?" And his answer, of course, is that it should speak two. This is increasingly the case, not only in Miami and the southwest. "New York," Flores and, Benmayor claim, already "is a bilingual city, as Spanish is daily currency in street life, in business, in public and social services, in schools, and in the home."[2] "Nowadays," Professor Ilan Stavans observes, "you can open a bank account, get medical care, watch soap operas, file your taxes, love and die in America without a single world 'en inglés.' In short, we are witnessing a reshaping of the nation's linguistic identity."[3] The driving force behind this Hispanization, the Mexican influx, shows no signs of weakening.

On July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox Quesada became the first opposition candidate to be elected president of Mexico in a relatively free and competitive election. Americans hailed this triumph of democracy south of their border. On July 4, 2000, in almost his first statement as president-elect, Fox advocated the end of controls on the movement of his peo-

ple north. In the past, "Mexico's goal," he said, "has been to open an escape valve, allowing 350,000 young people to cross the border each year and washing its hands of any responsibility." The goal of the United States "has been to put up walls, police and soldiers to fight immigration. That can't work."[4] Hence, he argued, the two countries must move toward an open border, allowing for the unrestricted movement of money, goods, and people. What he did not say is that without border controls, goods would flow in both directions, money flow south, and people flood north. A decade earlier Vicente Fox's predecessor Carlos Salinas de Gortari had compaigned across the United States arguing for NAFTA because reducing trade barriers would reduce immigration: "You must take our goods or our people." Vicente Fox says: "You must take both."

Immigration, Jorge Castañeda said, before becoming Fox's foreign minister, "has not been a problem in binational relations but, rather, has been part of the solution to other, graver problems." These graver problems are, of course, Mexico's problems and, Castañeda argued, "forcing Mexico to deter its citizens from emigrating... will make social peace in the *barrios* and *pueblos* of Mexico untenable."[5] Mexico, in his view, should not try to solve its problems; it should export them.

If each year a million Mexican soldiers attempted to invade the United States and more than 150,000 of them succeeded, established themselves on American territory, and the Mexican government then demanded that the United States recognize the legality of this invasion, Americans would be outraged and would mobilize whatever resources

were necessary to expel the invaders and to establish the integrity of their borders. Yet an illegal demographic invasion of comparable dimensions occurs each year, the president of Mexico argues that it should be legalized, and, at least before September 11, American political leaders more or less ignored it or implicitly accepted elimination of the border as a long-term goal.

In the past, Americans have taken actions that drastically affected the identity of their country without realizing that they were doing so. As we have seen, the 1964 Civil Rights Act was explicitly intended to remove racial preferences and quotas, but federal officials administered it so as to produce exactly the opposite. The 1965 immigration law was not intended to produce a massive wave of immigration from Asia and Latin America, but it did. These changes came about as a result of inattention to possible consequences, bureaucratic arrogance and subterfuge, and political opportunism. Something similar is happening with respect to Hispanization. Without national debate or conscious decision, America is being transformed into what could be a very different society from what it has been.

When Americans talk about immigration and assimilation, they have tended to generalize about immigrants without discriminating among them. They have thus hidden from themselves the peculiar characteristics, challenge, and problems posed by Hispanic, primarily Mexican, immigration. By avoiding, at least until 2004, the issue of Mexican immigration and treating the overall relationship with their neighbor as if it did not differ from that with other countries, they also avoided the issue of whether America will con-

tinue to be a country with a single national language and a common Anglo-Protestant mainstream culture. To ignore that question, however, is also to answer it and acquiesce in the eventual transformation of Americans into two peoples with two languages and two cultures.

If this happens and America ceases to be a "Babel in reverse" in which almost 300 million people share one and only one common language, it could become divided into a large number of people who know English and little or no Spanish and hence are limited to America's English world, a smaller number of people who know Spanish and little or no English, and hence can function only in the Hispanic community, and an indeterminate number of people fluent in both languages and hence much more able than the monolinguists to operate on a national basis. For over three hundred years, fluency in English has been a prerequisite to moving ahead in America. Now, however, fluency in both English and Spanish is becoming increasingly important for success in key sectors of business, academia, the media, and, most importantly, politics and government.

America appears to be moving in that direction through a process of creeping bilingualism. Hispanics numbered 38.8 million in June 2002, growing 9.8 percent since the 2000 census compared to 2.5 percent for Americans as a whole, and accounting for half of the American population growth in those two and one third years. The combination of sustained high immigration and high reproduction rates means their numbers and influence on American society will continue to increase. In 2000, 47 million people (18 percent of those age five and older) spoke a non-English language at home, 28.1 million of these spoke Spanish. The proportion

of Americans aged five and over speaking English less than "very well" grew from 4.8 percent in 1980 to 8.1 percent in 2000.[6]

The leaders of Hispanic organizations have been continuously active in promoting their language. Starting in the 1960s, Jack Citrin and his colleagues observe, "Hispanic activists articulated the concept of language rights as a constitucional entitlement."[7] They pressured government agencies and the courts to interpret laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national origin to require education of children in the language of their parents. Bilingual education has become Spanish language education, with the demand for teachers fluent in Spanish leading California, New York, and other states actively to recruit teachers from Spain and Puerto Rico.[8] With one carefully planned exception (*Lau v. California*), the principal court cases involving language rights have Spanish names: Gutiérrez, García, Yniguez, Jurado, Serna, Ríos, Hernández, Negrón, Soberal-Pérez, Castro.

Hispanic organizations have played a central role in persuading Congress to authorize cultural maintenance programs in bilingual education, with the result that children are slow to join mainstream classes. In New York in 1999, it was reported that "ninety percent of the students in Spanish bilingual programs fail to make it into mainstream classes after three years, as guidelines stipulate they should."[9] Many children have spent as many as nine years in these essentially Spanish language classes. This inevitably affects the speed and the extent to which they achieve command of English. Most second- and subsequent-generation Span-

ish-speaking immigrants acquire enough English to function in an English environment. As a result of the continuing huge inflow of migrants, however, Spanish speakers in New York, Miami, Los Angeles, and elsewhere are increasingly able to live normal lives without knowing English. Sixty-five percent of the children in bilingual education in New York City are in Spanish classes, and hence have little need or opportunity to use English in school. And apparently, unlike the mothers in Los Angeles, in New York, according to the *New York Times*, "Spanish-speaking parents [are] generally more receptive to having their children in such classes, and Chinese and Russian parents more resistant."[10] A person can, James Traub reported,

> live in an all-Spanish-speaking world in New York. "I try to tell the kids at least to watch TV in English," [the middle school teacher] Jose García said. "But these kids to home and speak Spanish; they watch TV and listen to music in Spanish; they go to the doctor, and the doctor speaks Spanish. You can go down the street here to the Chinese fruit store, and the Chinese grocer speaks Spanish." Spanish-speaking children don't ever have to break out of their enclosed world: New York has high schools that are virtually all Spanish and even a bilingual community college. Only when students leave school do they discover that their English isn't up to the demands of the job market.[11]

Bilingual education has been a euphemism for teaching students in Spanish and immersing them in Hispanic culture. The children of past generations of immigrants did not have such programs, became fluent in English, and absorbed America's culture. The children of contemporary non-Hispanic immigrants by and large learn English and as-

similate into American society faster than those of Hispanic immigrants. Quite apart from the controversies over its impact on students' academic progress, bilingual education has clearly had a negative impact on the integration of Hispanic students into American society.

Hispanic leaders have actively pushed the desirability of all Americans being fluent in both English and at least one other language, meaning Spanish. A persuasive case can be made that in a shrinking world all Americans should know at least one important foreign language—Chinese, Japanese, Hindi, Russian, Arabic, Bahasa Malay, French, German, Spanish—so as to be able to understand one foreign culture and communicate with its people. It is quite different to argue that Americans should know a non-English language in order to communicate with their fellow Americans. Yet that is what the Spanish advocates have in mind. "English is not enough," argues Osvaldo Soto, president of the Spanish American League Against Discrimination (SALAD). "We don't want a monolingual society."[12] The English Plus Information Clearing House, formed in 1987 by a coalition of Hispanic and other organizations, argued that all Americans should "acquire strong English language proficiency *plus* mastery of a second or multiple languages."

In dual language programs students are taught in both English and Spanish on an alternating basis. Their purposes is to make Spanish the equal of English in American society. "The dual language approach," two advocates argue, "has English-speaking children learn a new language while NES [non-English-speaking] children learn English. As children

learn the languages, they also learn about the two cultures involved. Thus, all children are acquiring a second language and facing similar problems. This minimizes the inferiority felt by members of the minority group." In March 2000, in his speech "Excelencia para Todos—Excellence for All," U.S. Secretary of Education Richard Riley endorsed dual language education and predicted that by 2050 one quarter of the U.S. population and a larger proportion of young people would be Spanish-speaking.[13]

The impetus toward bilingualism is supported not just by Hispanic groups but also by some liberal and civil rights organizations, church leaders, particularly Catholic ones, who see a growing constituency of communicants, and politicians, both Republican and Democratic, responding to the growing numbers and slowly rising naturalizations rates of Hispanic immigrants. Also of central importance are business concerns that appeal to the Hispanic market. Official English was opposed not only by "Univision, the Spanish-language television network that stood to lose viewers if students began learning English," but also by Hallmark, "which owns the Spanish language broadcast network SIN" and hence saw official English "as a threat to their ability to serve customers who speak languages other than English."[14]

The orientation of business to Hispanic customers means that they increasingly need bilingual employees. This was a central factor behind the 1980 oficial English referendum in Miami. As the sociologist Max Castro observes:

> Probably the single most resented consequence of the ethnic transformation was the increasing number of jobs in Miami that required bilingual skills. In this arena bilingualism had real, not just

> symbolic, consequences for non-Hispanic Miamians. But for many it also symbolized a reversal of the expectation that the newcomers must adjust to the dominant language and culture. Even worse, it conferred upon immigrants a labor market advantage based on a need that had been created by their own presence.[15]

Something similar occurred in the small town of Doraville, Georgia. The influx of Hispanics led the local supermarket owner to change his goods, signs, advertising, and language. It also forced him to change his employment policies. After making the switch, he said, "we wouldn't hire anybody unless they were bilingual." Then when it became difficult to find such people "we decided we had to hire people who are pretty much Spanish-only." Bilingualism also affects earnings. Bilingual police officers and firemen in southwestern cities such as Phoenix and Las Vegas are paid more than those who only speak English. In Miami, one study found, families that spoke only Spanish had average incomes of $18,000, English only families had average incomes of $32,000, while bilingual families averaged $50,376.[16] For the first time in American history, increasing numbers of Americans will not be able to get the jobs or the pay they would otherwise get because they can speak to their countrymen only in English.*

In the debates over language policy, Senator S. I. Hayakawa highlighted the unique role of Hispanics in opposing English:

---

* At some point in the bilingualization process, incentives give way to sanctions: in April 2003 the Canadian government announced that it was dismissing, demoting, or transferring two hundred senior civil servants who had not become sufficiently bilingual in English and French. *New York Times*, 3 April 2003, p. A8.

> Why is it that no Filipinos, no Koreans object to making English the official language? No Japanese have done so. And certainly not the Vietnamese, who are so damn happy to be here. They're learning English as fast as they can and winning spelling bees all across the country. But the Hispanics alone have maintained there is a problem. There [has been] considerable movement to make Spanish the second official language.[17]

The spread of Spanish as America's second language may or may not continue. If it does, this could, in due course, have significant consequences. In many states, those aspiring to political office might have to be fluent in both languages. Bilingual candidates for president and appointed national offices could have an advantage over English-only speakers. If dual-language education, that is, teaching children equally in English and Spanish, becomes prevalent in elementary and secondary schools, teachers would increasingly be expected to be bilingual. Government documents and forms could routinely be published in both languages. The use of both languages could become acceptable in congressional hearings and debates and in the general conduct of government business. Since most of those whose first language is Spanish will also probably have high fluency in English, English speakers lacking fluency in Spanish are likely to be at a disadvantage in the competition for jobs, promotions, and contracts.

In 1917 Theodore Roosevelt said: "We must have but one flag. We must also have but one language. That must be the language of the Declaration of Independence, of Washington's Farewell address, of Lincoln's Gettysburg speech and second inaugural." On June 14, 2000, President Clinton

said, "I very much hope that I'm the last President in American history who can't speak Spanish." On May 5, 2001, President Bush celebrated Mexico's Cinco de Mayo national holiday by inaugurating the practice of delivering the weekly presidential radio address to the American people in both English and Spanish.[18] On March 1, 2002, the two candidates, Tony Sanchez and Victor Morales, for the Democratic nomination to be governor of Texas, held a formal public debate in Spanish. On September 4, 2003, the first debate among the Democratic candidates for president was conducted in both English and Spanish. Despite the opposition of large majorities of Americans, Spanish is joining the language of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Roosevelts, and Kennedys as the language of America. If this trend continues, the cultural division between Hispanics and Anglos will replace the racial division between blacks and whites as the most serious cleavage in American society. A bifurcated America with two languages and two cultures will be fundamentally different from the America with one language and one core Anglo-Protestant culture that has existed for over three centuries.

Unrepresentative Democracy: Elites vs. The Public

The views of the public on issues of national identity differ significantly from those of many elites. These differences reflect the underlying contrast, spelled out in Chapter 10, between the high levels of nationale pride and commitment to the nation on the part of the public and the extent to which elites have been denationalized and favor transna-

2000, in which people were asked to identify themselves as liberal, moderate, or conservative. Consistently, about one quarter identified themselves as liberal, about one third as conservative, and 35 percent to 40 percent as moderate. The attitudes of elites were quite different. Surveys between 1979 and 1985 of elites in a dozen occupations and institutions asked the same question used in the public opinion surveys. The proportions of the elites in these groups identifying themselves as liberal were as follows, together with the public's choice in 1980.[19]

Public interest groups	91%
Television	75
Labor	73
Movies	67
Religion	59
Bureaucrats	56
Media	55
Judges	54
Congressional aides	52
Lawyers	47
The public	25
Business	14
Military	9

Apart from business and the military, these elites were almost twice to more than three times as liberal as the public as a whole. Another survey similarly found that on moral issues leaders are "consistently more liberal" than rank-and-file Americans. Governmental, nonprofit, and communications elites in particular are overwhelmingly liberal in their

outlooks. So also are academics. In a 1969 survey, 79 percent of faculty at high-quality schools considered themselves liberal compared to 45 percent of those at low-quality schools. In a 2001-2002 UCLA survey of 32,000 full-time faculty, 48 percent of faculty said they were "liberal" or "far left", 18 percent said they were "conservative" or "far right." The radical students of the 1960s, as Stanley Rothman had observed, had become tenured professors, particularly in elite institutions. "Social science faculties at elite institutions are overwhelmingly liberal and cosmopolitan or on the Left. Almost any form of civic loyalty or patriotism is considered reactionary."[20]

Liberalism tends to go with irreligiosity: In a 1969 study by Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Ladd, the percentages of academics who identified themselves as liberal were as follows:[21]

Liberalism and Religion of Academics

Religious Commitment	Religious Background		
	Jewish	Catholic	Protestant
Deeply Religious	48%	33%	31%
Largely Indifferent to Religion	75	56	50
Basically Opposed to Religion	82	73	71

These differences in ideology, religion, and nationalism generate differences on domestic and foreign policy issues related to national identity. As the analysis in Chapter 7 makes clear, elites and the public have differed fundamentally on the salience of two central elements of American identity, the Creed and the English language. There is, Jack

Citrin observes, a "gulf between elite advocacy of multiculturalism and stub-born mass support of assimilation to a common national identity."[22] The parallel gap between the nationalist public and cosmopolitan elites has its most dramatic impact the relation between American identity and foreign policy. As Citrin and his colleagues concluded in their 1994 study, "the dwindling of consensus about America's international role follows from the waning of agreement on what is means to be an American, on the very character of American nationalism. The domestic underpinnings for the long post-World War II hegemony of cosmopolitan liberalism and internationalism have frayed, quite apart from the fact that the United States no longer confronts a powerful military adversary."[23]

Publics and elites have had similar views on many important foreign policy issues. Substantial and continuing differences, however, have existed on questions affecting American identity and the American role in the world.* The public is overwhelmingly concerned with the protection on military security, societal security, the domestic economy, and sovereignty. Foreign policy elites are more concerned with U.S. promotion of international security, peace, globalization, and the economic development of foreign nations than in the public. In 1998 the public and the leaders differed by 22 percent to 42 percent on thirty-four major foreign policy issues. The American public is also more pessimistic than its elites. In 1998, 58 percent of the public and only 23

* The quadrential polls of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations starting in 1974 are an indispensable source of the views on foreign policy of both the public and foreign policy leaders. Unless otherwise cited the data here come from these reports.

percent of the leaders thought there would be more violence in the twenty-first century than in the twentieth, while 40 percent of the leaders and 19 percent of the public thought there would be less. Three years before September 11, 84 percent of the public but only 61 percent of the leaders saw international terrorism as a "critical threat" to the United States.

Public nationalism and elite transnationalism are evident on a variety of issues. In six polls from 1978 to 1998, 96 percent to 98 percent of the foreign policy elites favored the United States taking an active part in world affairs, but only 59 percent to 65 percent of the public did. With a few exceptions the public has been much more reluctant than the leaders to use U.S. military force to defend other countries against invasion. In 1998, for instance, minorities of the public ranging from 27 percent to 46 percent and majorities of the leaders ranging from 51 percent to 79 percent favored the use of military forces in response to hypothetical invasions of Saudi Arabia by Iraq, Israel by Arabs, South Korea by North Korea, Poland by Russia, and Taiwan by China. On the other hand, the public is more concerned with upheavals closer to home. In 1998, 38 percent of the public and only 18 percent of the leaders supported U.S. military intervention if the Cuban people attempted to overthrow Castro, and in 1990, 54 percent of the public and 20 percent of the leaders favored the use of U.S. military force if Mexico were threatened by revolution. While the public is reluctant to support U.S. military action to defend other countries against invasion, a substantial majority, 72 percent, said the United States should not act alone in international crises

without support from its allies, as compared to 48 percent of the leaders saying it should not do so. The public's backing for collaborative action was also reflected in their 57 percent approval of the United States taking part "in U.N. international peacekeeping forces in troubled parts of the world."

The public has been much less favorable than the leaders toward American economic involvement in the world. In 1998, 87 percent of foreign policy leaders and 54 percent of the public thought economic globalization was mostly good for the United States, while 12 percent of the leaders and 35 percent of the public thought is mostly bad or equally good and bad. In seven polls from 1974 to 1998, no more than 53 percent of the public and no less than 86 percent of the leaders supported giving economic aid to other nations. In four polls from 1980 to 1998, 50 percent to 64 percent of the public and 18 percent to 32 percent of the leaders favored cutting back economic aid. Similarly, in 1998, 82 percent of the leaders and only 25 percent of the public thought the United States should join other countries and "contribute more money to the IMF to meet world financial crises," while 51 percent of the public and 15 percent of the leaders thought the United States should not do this.

Despite the arguments of elites and government leaders in favor of reducing obstacles to international trade, the American public has remained stubbornly protectionist. In 1986, 66 percent of the public but only 31 percent of the leaders thought tariffs wre necessary. In 1994, 40 percent of the public and 79 percent of the leaders were sympathetic to eliminating tariffs. In 1998, 40 percent of the public and 16

percent of the leaders thought that economic competition from low-wage countries was "a critical threat" to America. In the 1986, 1994, and 1998 polls, 79 percent to 84 percent of the public and 44 percent to 51 percent of the leaders thought that protecting American jobs should be a "very important goal" of the American government. In a 1998 multination poll, the American public ranked eighth among twenty-two peoples in its support for protection with 56 percent of Americans saying they thought protectionism best for the American economy, while 37 percent said free trade was. In April 2000, 48 percent of Americans said they thought international trade was bad for the American economy compared to 34 percent who viewed it positively.[24] During those years, both Democratic and Republican administrations pursued free trade policies reflecting elite preferences opposed by majorities or substantial pluralities of the American people.

Although Americans like to think of their country as a nation of immigrants, it seems probable that at no time in American history has a majority of Americans favored the expansion of immigration. This is clearly the case since the 1930s when survey evidence became available. In three 1938 and 1939 polls, 68 percent, 71 percent, and 83 percent of Americans opposed altering existing law to allow more European refugees into America. In subsequent years, the extent and intensity of public opposition to immigration varied with the state of the economy and the sources of immigrants, but high immigration has never been popular overall. In nineteen polls from 1945 to 2002, the proportion of the public favoring increased immigration never rose

above 14 percent and was less than 10 percent in fourteen polls. The proportion wanting less immigration was never less than 33 percent, rose to 65 percent to 66 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s, and dropped to 49 percent in 2002. In the 1990s, large majorities of the public ranked large numbers of immigrants and nuclear proliferation as "critical threats" to America, with international terrorism coming in a close third. In the 1995-1997 World Values Survey, the United States ranked fifth (behind the Philippines, Taiwan, South Africa, and Poland) out of forty-four countries in the proportion, 62.3 percent, of its population that wanted to prohibit or put strict limits on immigration.[25] The people of this "nation of immigrants" have been more hostile to immigration than those of most other countries.

Prior to World War II, American business, social, and political elites often opposed immigration, and, of course, were responsible for the 1921 and 1924 laws restricting it. In the late twentieth century, however, elite opposition decreased markedly. Adherents of neo-liberal economics, such as Julian Simon and the *Wall Street Journal*, argued that the free movement of people was as essential to globalization and economic growth as the free movement of goods, capital and technology. Business elites welcomed the depressing effect immigration would have on the wages of workers and the power of unions. Leading liberals supported immigration for humanitarian reasons and as a way of reducing the gross inequalities between rich and poor countries. Restrictions on the immigration of any particular nationality were viewed as politically incorrect, and efforts to limit immigration generally were at times thought to be inherently suspect as racist attempts to maintain white dom-

inance in America. By 2000 even the leadership of the AFL-CIO was modifying its previously staunch objections to immigration.[26]

This shift in elite opinion produced a major gap between elite and public attitudes, and meant, of course, that government policy would continue to reflect the former rather than the latter. In the 1994 and 1998 Chicago Council polls, 74 percent and 57 percent of the public and 31 percent and 18 percent of foreign policy leaders thought that large numbers of immigrants were a "critical threat" to the United States. In these same years, 73 percent and 55 percent of the public and 28 percent and 21 percent of the leaders thought that reducing illegal immigration should be "a very important goal" for America. In a 1997 poll asking to what extent the federal government had been successful in achieving sixteen policy goals, "controlling illegal immigration" came in next to the last (reducing drug abuse), with 72 percent of the public saying it had been fairly or very *un*successful.[27]

The persistent and pervasive anti-immigration attitudes often reflect a door-closing approach: "It's great we got in, but any more will be disastrous." A 1993 *Newsweek* poll asked people whether immigration had been "a good thing or a bad thing for this country in the past." Fifty-nine percent said a good thing and 31 percent a bad thing. Asked whether immigrations was "a good thing or a bad thing for this country today," the proportions were exactly reversed: 29 percent good, 60 percent bad. The American public was thus divided almost equally: one third for past and present immigration, one third against past and present immigration, and one third doors-closers approving past immigration and

against it now. Immigrants often are door-closers too. A Latino National Political Survey in 1992 found that 65 percent of American citizens or legal residents of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban descent thought there were "too many immigrants in this country," a skepticism also manifested in answers to a 1984 survey of Texas Mexican-Americans by Rodolfo de la Garza.[28]

The differences between elites and the public produced a growing gap between the prefferences of the public and policies embodied in law. One study of whether changes in public opinion on a wide range of issues were followed by comparable changes in public policy showed a steady decline from the 1970s when there was a 75 percent congruence between public opinion and government policy to 67 percent in 1984-1987, 40 percent in 1989-1992, and 37 percent in 1993-1994. "The evidence, overall," the authors of this study concluded, "points to a persistent pattern since 1980: a generally low and at times declining level of responsiveness to public opinion especially during the first two years of the Clinton presidency." Hence, they said, there is no basis for thinking that Clinton or other political leaders were "pandering to the public." Another study showed that policy outcomes were consistent with the majority preferences of the public 63 percent of the time between 1960 and 1979 but dropped to 55 percent between 1980 and 1993. Somewhat similarly, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations reports that the number of issues on which public and elite views on foreign policy differed by more than 30 percent increased from nine in 1982 and six 1986 to twenty-seven in 1990, fourteen in 1994, and fifteen in 1998.

The issues where the public-elite difference was 20 percent or more rose from twenty-six in 1994 to thirty-four in 1998. "A disturbing gap is growing," one analyst of these surveys concluded, "between what ordinary Americans believe is the proper role of the United States in world affairs and the views of leaders responsible for making foreign policy."[29] Governmental policy at the end of the twentieth century as deviating more and more from the preferences of the American public.

The failure of political leaders to "pander" to the public had predictable consequences. When government policies on important issues deviate sharply from the views of the public, one would expect the public to lose trust in government, to reduce its interest and participation in politics, and to turn to alternative means of policymaking not controlled by political elites. All three happened in the late twentieth century. All three undoubtedly had many causes, which social scientists have explored at length, and one trend, decline in trust, occurred in most industrialized democracies. Yet at least for the United States, it can be assumed that the growing gap between public preferences and government policies contributed to all three trends.

First, public confidence in and trust in government and the major private institutions of American society declined dramatically from the 1960s to the 1990s. The decline in trust in government is shown in Figure 11.1. As Robert Putnam, Susan Pharr, and Russell Dalton point out, on every question asked concerning confidence in their government, roughly two thirds of the public expressed confidence in the 1960s and only about one third in the 1990s. In April 1966,



Percent expressing "a great deal" of confidence in the executive branch and Congress. Source: Louis Harris Poll, 1996. Reprinted with permission from Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, David C. King, eds., *Why People Don't Trust Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press reprint, 1997), p. 207.

for instance, "with the Vietnam War raging and race riots in Cleveland, Chicago, and Atlanta, 66 percent of Americans *rejected* the view that 'the people running the country don't really care what happens to you.' In December 1997, in the midst of the longest period of peace and prosperity in more than two generations, 57 percent of Americans *endorsed* that same view."[30] Similar declines occurred over these decades in the degree that the public had confidence in major public and private institutions. Beginning in 1973, Americans were asked every year or two whether they had "a great deal," "some," or "hardly any" confidence in the leaders of

these institutions. Subtracting the "hardly any" responses from the "a great deal" responses produces a rough index of confidence. In 1973 the leaders of organized labor and television had negative indices of -10 and -3 respectively. All the others were positive, ranging from +8 for the press to +48 for medicine. By 2000 the confidence indices for the leaders of all these institucions, except two, had declined, most of them quite significantly. Five had negative indices. As might be expected, the changes were dramatic for the two policymaking branches of government, Congress dropping 25 points from +9 to -16 and the executive branch dropping 31 points from +11 to -20. In contrast, the two increases in confidence involved the nonelected institutions of government, the Supreme Court, rising from +16 to +19, and the military, from +16 to +28.[31]

Second, as many studies have shown, public participation and interest in the major governmental and private institutions of American society declined fairly consistently from the 1960s to the 1990s. Sixty-three percent of the adult population voted in 1960, but only 49 percent in 1996 and 51 percent in 2000. In addition, as Thomas Patterson observes, "Since 1960, participation has declined in virtually every area of election activity, from the volunteers who work on campaigns to the viewers who watch televised debates. The United States had 100 million fewer people in 1960 than it did in 2000 but, even so, more viewers tuned in to the October presidential debates in 1960 than did so in 2000." In the 1970s, one in three taxpayers allocated a dollar from their tax payments to the fund created by Congress to support political campaigns. In 2000, one in eight did so.[32]

The third consequence of the gap between leaders and the public was the dramatic proliferation of initiatives on major policy issues, including those relating to national identity. Initiatives had been an instrument of Progressive reform before World War I. Their use, however, then declined steadily from fifty per two-year election cycle to twenty in the early 1970s. As legislatures neglected the concerns of their constituents, initiatives regained popularity, beginning in June 1978, when 65 percent of California voters approved Proposition 13, drastically limiting taxes, despite the opposition of virtually all the state's political, business and media establishment. This started a tripling of initiatives to an average of sixty-one per two-year election cycle from the late 1970s to 1998. Fifty-five initiatives were voted on in 1998, sixty-nine in 2000, and forty-nine in 2002. As we have seen, elite attitudes on issues such as racial preferences and bilingual education were effectively challenged by economic and political entrepreneurs such as Ward Connerly and Ron Unz, who used the initiative process to compel referenda on these issues. Surveying this record, David Broder concluded, "The trust between governors and governed on which representative government depends has been badly depleted."[33]

As the twentieth century ended, major gaps existed between America's elites and the general public over the salience of national identity compared to other identities and over the appropriate role for America in the world. Substantial elite elements were increasingly divorced from their country, and the American public was increasingly disillusioned with its government.

Notes

1. William V. Flores and Rina Benmayor, *Latino Cultural Citzenship: Claiming Identity, Space and Rights* (Boston Beacon Press, 1997), p. 3, 5, 9-10.
2. Dorfman quoted in *New York Times*, 24 June 1998, p. A31; Flores and Benmayor, *Latino Cultural Citizenship*, p. 7.
3. *Boston Globe*, 8 January 1995, p. A31.
4. *New York Times*, 5 July 2000, p. A5.
5. Jorge G. Casteñeda, "Ferocious Differences", *Atlantic Monthly*, 276 (July 1995), p.76
6. Hyon B. Shin with Rosalind Bruno, *Language Use and English-Speaking Ability* (U.S. Census Bureau, October 2003), p. 2-3; U.S. Newswire, "Hispanic Population Reaches All-Time High News Census Bureau Estimates Show" (Medialink Worldwide Release, 18 June 2003).
7. Jack Citrin, Donald Philip Green, Beth Reingnold, Evelyn Walters, "The 'Official English' Movement and the Symbolic Politics of Language in the United States" *Western Political Quarterly*, 43 (September 1990), p. 537.
8. *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 September 1998, p. B1.
9. James Traub, "The Bilingual Barrier" *New York Times Magazine*, 31 January 1999, p. 35.
10. *New York Times*, 16 December 2000, p. A15.
11. Traub, "The Bilingual Barrier" p. 35.
12. Quoted in James Crawford, *Bilingual Education: History, Politics, Theory and Practice* (Los Angeles, Bilingual Educational Services. 1995), p. 65.
13. Quoted in Raymond Tatalovich, *Nativism Reborn?: The Official English Language Movement and the American States* (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky 1995), p. 17; Pamela L. Tidet and Iris M. Tiedt, *Multicultural Teaching: A Handbook of Activities, Information, and Resources* (Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 2 nd ed., 1986), p. 15; Richard W. Riley, remarks, Bell Multicultural High School, Washington, D.C, 15 March 2000.

14. *New York Times*, 16 August 1999, p. B1; Geoffrey Nunberg, "Linguistics and The Official Language Movement", *Language*, 65 (September 1989), p. 586.
15. Max J. Castro, "On the Curious Question of Language in Miami," in James Crawford, ed., *Language Loyalties* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992) p. 183.
16. *Washington Post*, 6 February 1999, p. A4; Domenico Maceri, "Americans Are Embracing Spanish," *International Herald Tribune*, 24 June 2003, p.6.
17. S.I. Hayakawa quoted in James Crawford, *Hold Your Tongue: Bilingualism and the Politics of "English Only"* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 1992), p. 149-50.
18. Theodore Roosevelt, "One Flag, One Language (1917)," in Crawford, ed., *Language Loyalties*, p. 85; *New York Times*, 6 May 2001, p. 25; *Boston Globe*, 6 May 2001, p. A6; *Financial Times*, 23 June 2000, p. 15.
19. Robert Lerner, Althea K. Nagai, Stanley Rothman, *American Elites* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996), p. 50; General Social Survey 1980.
20. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., and Seymour Martin Lipset, *The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics* (New York, Mc Graw-Hill, 1975), p. 141-6; Jennifer A. Lindholm *et al*., *The American College Teacher: National Norms for the 2001-2002 HERI Faculty Survey* (Los Angeles, UCLA Higher Education Research Institute, 2002); Stanley Rothman, "Academics on the Left," *Society*, 23 (March/April 1986), p. 6; Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., *Report on American Values in the 80's: The Impact of Belief* (New York, Research & Forecasts, 1986), p. 27-28.
21. Ladd and Lipset, *Survey of the Social, Political, and Educational Perspectives*, p.163
22. Jack Citrin, "The End of American Identity?" in Stanley A. Renshon, ed., *One America? Political Leadership, National Identity, and the Dilemmas of Diversity* (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2001), p. 303.

23. Jack Citrin *et al*., "Is American Nationalism Chaging? Implications for Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, 38 (March 1994), p. 26-27.
24. *Economist,* 2 January 1999, p. 59; *International Herald Tribune*, 17-18 March 2001, p. 10; David Broder, citing NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* poll *Washington Post Weekly Edition*, 2-8 April 2001, p.4.
25. Rita J. Simon, "Old Minorities, New Immigrants: Aspirations, Hopes, and Fears," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 530 (November 1993), p. 63, 68; *The American Enterprise*, Public Opinion and Demographic Report, referring to series of pools from different sources, 5 (January/February 1994), p. 97; *World Values Survey*, 1995-1997.
26. See Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., *American Unionism and U.S. Imigration Policy* (Washington, D.C., Center for Immigration Studies, August 2001).
27. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., and Karlyn H. Bowman, *What's Wrong: A Survey of American Satisfaction and Complaint* (Washington, D. C., AEI Press 1998), p. 92-93.
28. *Newsweek*, 9 August 1993, p. 19; Simon, "Old Minorities, New Immigrants," p. 62, 64; *Time*, 1 March 1993, p. 72.
29. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Debunking the Pandering Politician Myth," *Public Perspective*, 8 (April/May 1997), p. 3-5; Alan D. Monroe, "Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 62 (Spring 1998), p. 6; Richard Morin, "A Gap in Worldviews," *Washington Post Weekly Edition*, 19 April 1999, p. 34.
30. Susan J. Pharr, Robert D. Putnam, Russel J. Dalton, "What's Troubling the Trilateral Democracies," in Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 200), p. 9-10.
31. James Allan Davis and Tom W. Smith, *General Social Surveys*, 1972-2000 [machine-readable data file] (Storrs, CT, Roper Center Public Opinion Reserach).

32. Thomas E. Patterson, *The Vanishing Voter: Public Involvement in an Age of Uncertainty* (New York, Knopf, 2002), p. 4-5.
33. David S. Broder, *Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Money* (New York, Harcourt, 2000), p. 3, 6-7; *Economist*, 9 November 2002, p. 30.