Identities: National and Other[*]

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The Concept of Identity

The "concept of identity," it has been said, "is as indispensable as it is unclear." It "is manifold, hard to define and evades many ordinary methods of measurement." The twentieth century's leading scholar of identity, Erik Erikson, termed the concept "all-pervasive" but also "vague" and "unfathomable." The infuriating inescapability of identity is well demonstrated in the work of the distinguished social theorist Leon Wieseltier. In 1996 he published a book, *Against Identity*, denouncing and ridiculing the fascination of intellectuals with that concept. In 1998, he published another book, *Kaddish*, an eloquent, passionate, and explicit affirmation of his own Jewish identity. Identity, it appears, is like sin: however much we may oppose it, we cannot escape it.[1]

Given its unavoidability, how do we define it? Scholars have various answers, which nonetheless converge on one central theme. Identity is an individual's or a group's sense

of self. It is a product of self-consciousness, that I or we possess distinct qualities as an entity that differentiates me from you and us from them. A new baby may have elements of an identity at birth in terms of a name, sex, parentage, and citizenship. These do not, however, become part of his or her identity until the baby becomes conscious of them and defines itself in terms of them. Identity, as one group of scholars phrased it, "refers to the images of individuality and distinctiveness ('selfhood') held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant 'others.'"[2] So long as people interact with others, they have no choice but to define themselves in relation to those others and identify their similarities with and differences from those others.

Identities are important because they shape the behavior of people. If I think of myself as a scholar, I will try to act like a scholar. But individuals also can change their identities. If I begin to act differently—as a polemicist, for instance—I will suffer "cognitive dissonance" and am likely to try to relieve the resulting anguish by stopping that behavior or by redefining myself from a scholar to a political advocate. Similarly, if a person inherits a partisan identity as a Democrat but increasingly finds him- or herself voting for Republican candidates, that person may well redefine him- or herself as a Republican.

Several key points concerning identities need to be made.

First, both individuals and groups have identities. Individuals, however, find and redefine their identities in groups. As social identity theory has shown, the need for

identity leads them even to seek identity in an arbitrarily and randomly constructed group. An individual may be a member of many groups and hence is able to shift identities. Group identity, on the other hand, usually involves a primary defining characteristic and is less fungible. I have identities as a political scientist and a member of the Harvard Department of Government. Conceivably, I could redefine myself as a historian or become a member of the Stanford Department of Political Science, if they were willing to accept this change in my identity. The Harvard Department of Government, however, cannot become a history department or move as an institution to Stanford. Its identity is much more fixed than mine. If the basis for the defining characteristic of a group disappears, perhaps because it achieves the goal it was created to achieve, the existence of the group is threatened, unless it can find another cause to motivate its members.

Second, identities are, overwhelmingly, constructed. People make their identity, under varying degrees of pressure, inducements, and freedom. In an oft-quoted phrase, Benedict Anderson described nations as "imagined communities." Identities are imagined selves: they are what we think we are and what we want to be. Apart from ancestry (although that can be repudiated), gender (and people occasionally change that), and age (which may be denied but not changed by human action), people are relatively free to define their identities as they wish, although they may not be able to implement those identities in practice. They may inherit their ethnicity and race but these can be redefined or rejected, and the meaning and applicability of a term like "race" changes over time.

Third, individuals and to a lesser extent groups have multiple identities. These may be ascriptive, territorial, economic, cultural, political, social, and national. The relative salience of these identities to the individual or group can change from time to time and situation to situation, as can the extent to which these identities complement or conflict with each other. "Only extreme social situations," Karmela Liebkind observes, "such as battles in war, may temporarily eradicate all other group affiliations but one."[3]

Fourth, identities are defined by the self but they are the product of the interaction between the self and others. How others perceive an individual or group affects the self-definition of that individual or group. If one enters a new social situation and is perceived as an outsider who does not belong, one is likely to think of oneself that way. If a large majority of the people in a country think that members of a minority group are inherently backward and inferior, the minority group members may internalize that concept of themselves, at which point it becomes part of their identity. Alternatively, they may react against that characterization and define themselves in opposition to it. External sources of identity may come from the immediate environment, the broader society, or political authorities. Governments have, indeed, assigned racial or other identities to people.

People can aspire to an identity but not be able to achieve it unless they are welcomed by those who already have that identity. The crucial post-Cold War issue for East European peoples was whether the West would accept their identification of themselves as part of the West. Westerners have accepted Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians. They are less

likely to do that with some other Eastern European peoples who also want a Western identity. They have been quite reluctant to do so with the Turks, whose bureaucratic elites desperately want Turkey to be Western. As a result, Turks have been, conflicted over whether they should think of themselves primarily as European, Western, Muslim, Middle Eastern, or even Central Asian.

Fifth, the relative salience of alternative identities for any individual or group is situational. In some situations, people stress that aspect of their identity that links them to the people with whom they are interacting. In other situations, people emphasize that aspect of their identity that distinguishes them from others. A female psychologist, is has been argued, in the company of a dozen male psychologists will think of herself as a woman; in the company of a dozen women who are not psychologists, she will think of herself as a psychologist.[4] The salience of people's identity with their homeland typically increases when they travel abroad and observe the different ways of life of foreigners. In attempting to free themselves from Ottoman rule, Serbs stressed their Orthodox religion, while Muslim Albanians stressed their ethnicity and language. Similarly, the founders of Pakistan defined its identity in terms of their Muslim religion to justify independence from India. A few years later the Muslim Bangladeshi emphasized culture and language to legitimate their independence from their Pakistani co-religionists.

Identities may be narrow or broad, and the breadth of the most salient identity changes with the situation people are in. "You" and "I" become "we" when a "they" appears,

or, as an Arab saying has it, "My brother and I against our cousins, we and our cousins against the world." As people increasingly interact with people of more distant and different cultures, they also broaden their identities. For French and Germans, their national identity loses salience in relation to their European identity, as Jonathan Mercer says, when there emerges a broader "sense of difference between 'us' and 'them,' or between the European and the Japanese identities."[5] Hence it is only natural that the processes of globalization should lead to the broader identities of religion and civilization assuming greater importance for individuals and peoples.

Others and Enemies

To define themselves, people need and other. Do they also need an enemy? Some people clearly do. "Oh, how wonderful it is to hate," said Josef Goebbels. "Oh, what a relief to fight, to fight enemies who defend themselves, enemies who are awake," said André Malraux. These are extreme articulations of a generally more subdued but widespread human need, as acknowledged by two of the twentieth century's greatest minds. Writing to Sigmund Freud in 1933, Albert Einstein argued that every attempt to eliminate war had "ended in a lamentable breakdown... man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction." Freud agreed: people are like animals, he wrote back, they solve problems through the use of force, and only an all-powerful world state could prevent this from happening. Humans, Freud argued, have only two types of instincts, "those which seek to

preserve and unite... and those which seek to destroy and kill." Both are essential and they operate in conjunction with each other. Hence, "there is no use in trying to get rid of men's aggressive inclinations."[6]

Other scholars of human psychology and human relations have made similar arguments. There is a need, Vamik Volkan has said, "to have enemies and allies." This tendency appears in early-mid-adolescence when "the other group comes to be definitely viewed as the enemy." The psyche is "the creator of the concept of the enemy... As long as the enemy group is kept at least at a psychological distance, it gives us aid and comfort, enhancing our cohesion and making comparisons with ourselves gratifying." Individuals need self-esteem, recognition, approbation, what Plato, as Francis Fukuyama reminded us, designated *thymos* and Adam Smith termed vanity. Conflict with the enemy reinforces these qualities in the group.[7]

The need of individuals for self-esteem leads them to believe that their group is better than other groups. Their sense of self rises and falls with the fortunes of the groups with which they identity and with the extent to which other people are excluded from their group. Ethnocentrism, as Mercer puts it, is "the logical corollary to egocentrism." Even when their group may be totally arbitrary, temporary, and "minimal," people still, as social identity theory predicts, discriminate in favor of their group as compared to another group. Hence in many situations people choose to sacrifice absolute gains in order to achieve relative gains. They prefer to be worse off absolutely but better off compared to someone they see as a rival rather than better off ab-

solutely but not as well off as that rival: "beating the outgroup is more important than sheer profit." This preference has been repeatedly supported by evidence from psychological experiments and public opinion polls, not to mention common sense and everyday experience. To the bafflement of economists, Americans say that they would prefer to be worse off economically but ahead of the Japanese rather than better off and behind the Japanese.[8]

Recognition of difference does not necessarily generate competition, much less hate. Yet even people who have little psychological need to hate can become involved in processes leading to the creation of enemies. Identity requires differentiation. Differentiation necessitates comparison, the identification of the ways in which, "our" group differs from "their" group. Comparison, in turn, generates evaluation: Are the ways of our group better or worse than the ways of their group? Group egotism leads to justification: Our ways are better than their ways. Since the members of the other group are engaged in a similar process, conflicting justifications lead to competition. We have to demonstrate the superiority of our ways to their ways. Competition leads to antagonism and the broadening of what may have started as the perception of narrow differences into more intense and fundamental ones. Stereotypes are created, the opponent is demonized, the other is transmogrified into the enemy.

While the need for enemies explains the ubiquity of conflict between and within human societies, it does not explain the forms and locales of conflict. Competition and conflict can only occur between entities that are in the same universe or arena. In some sense, as Volkan put it, "the en-

emy" has to be "like us."[9] A soccer team may view another soccer team as its rival; it will not view a hockey team that way. The history department in one university will see history departments in other universities as its rivals for faculty, students, prestige within the discipline of history. It will not see the physics department in its own university in that light. It may, however, see the physics department as a rival for funding within their university. Competitors have to be playing on the same chessboard and most individuals and groups compete on several different chessboards. The chessboards have to be there but the players may change, and one game is succeeded by another. Hence, the likelihood of general or lasting peace among ethnic groups, states, or nations is remote. As human experience shows, the end of a hot or cold war creates the conditions for another. "A part of being human," as a committee of psychiatrists put it, "has always been the search for an enemy to embody temporarily or permanently disavowed aspects of our selves."[10] Late-twentieth-century distinctiveness theory, social identity theory, sociobiology, and attribution theory all lend support to the conclusion that the roots of hate, rivalry, the need for enemies, personal and group violence, and war are ineluctably located in human psychology and the human condition.

Sources of Identity

People have an almost infinite number of possible sources of identity. These include'ones that are primarily:

1. *Ascriptive*, such as age, ancestry, gender, kin (blood relatives), ethnicity (defined as extended kin), and race.
2. *Cultural*, such as clan, tribe, ethnicity (defined as a way of life), language, nationality, religion, civilization.
3. *Territorial*, such as neighborhood, village, town, city, province, state, section, country, geographical area, continent, hemisphere.
4. *Political*, such as faction, clique, leader, interest group, movement, cause, party, ideology, state.
5. *Economic*, such as job, occupation, profession, work group, employer, industry, economic sector, labor union, class.
6. *Social*, such as friends, club, team, colleagues, leisure group, status.

Any individual is likely to be involved in many of these groupings, but that does not necessarily mean that they are sources of his or her identity. A person may, for instance, find either his job or his country loathsome and totally reject it. In addition, relations among identities are complex. A differentiated relation exists when the identities are compatible in the abstract but at times, such as family identity and job identity, may impose conflicting demands on the individual. Other identities, such as territorial or cultural identities, are hierarchical in terms of their scope. Broader identities are inclusive of narrower identities, and the less inclusive identity, to a province, for instance, may or may not conflict with the more inclusive identity to a country. In addition, identities of the same sort may or may not be ex-

clusive. People may, for instance, assert dual nationality and claim to be both American and Italian, but it is difficult for them to assert dual religiosity and claim to be both Muslim and Catholic.

Identities also differ in their intensity. Intensity often varies inversely with scope; people identify more intensely with their family than with their political party, but this is not always the case. In addition, the salience of identities of all types varies with the interactions between the individual or group and its environment.

Narrower and broader identities in a single hierarchy may either reinforce or conflict with each other. In a famous phrase, Edmund Burke argued that "To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ, as it were) of public affections. The love to the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality." The "little platoon" phenomenon is key to military success. Armies win battles because their soldiers intensely identify with their immediate comrades in arms. Failure to promote small unit cohesion, as the U.S. Army learned in Vietnam, can lead to military disaster. At times, however, subordinate loyalties conflict with and perhaps displace broader ones, as with territorial movements for autonomy or independence. Hierarchical identities coexist uneasily with each other.

The False Dichotomy

Nations, nationalism, and national identity are, in large part, the product of the tumultuous course of European his-

tory from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. War made the state and it also made nations. "No Nation, in the true sense of the word," the historian Michael Howard argues, "could be born without war... no self-conscious community could establish itself as a new and independent actor on the world scene without an armed conflict or the threat of one."[11] People developed their sense of national identity as they fought to differentiate themselves from other people with different language, religion, history, or location.

The French and the English and then the Dutch, Spanish, French, Swedes, Prussians, Germans, and Italians crystallized their national identities in the crucible of way. To survive and to succeed in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, kings and princes increasingly had to mobilize the economic and demographic resources of their territories and eventually to create national armies to replace mercenary ones. In the process they promoted national consciousness and the confrontation of nation against nation. By the 1790s, as R.R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun."[12] Only in the mid-eighteenth century do the words "nations" and "*patrie*" enter into European languages. The emergence of British identity was prototypical. English identity was defined in wars against the French and the Scots. British identity subsequently emerged as "an invention forged above all by war. Time and time again, war with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into confrontation with an obviously hostile. Other and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it. They defined

themselves as Protestants struggling for survival against the world's foremost Catholic power."[13]

Scholars generally posit two types of nationalism and national identity, which they variously label: civic and ethnic, political and cultural, revolutionary and tribalist, liberal and integral, rational-associational and organic-mystical, civic-territorial and ethnic-genealogical, or simply patriotism and nationalism.[14] In each pairing, the first is seen as good, and the second as bad. The good, civic nationalism, assumes an open society based, at least in theory, on a social contract to which people of any race or ethnicity are able to subscribe and thus become citizens. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, is exclusive, and membership in the nation is limited to those who share certain primordial, ethnic, or cultural characteristics. In the early nineteenth century, scholars argue, nationalism and efforts in European societies to create national identities were primarily of the civic variety. Nationalist movements affirmed the equality of citizens, thereby undermining class and status distinctions. Liberal nationalism challenged authoritarian multinacional empires. Subsequently, romanticism and other movements generated illiberal ethnic nationalism, glorifying the ethnic community over the individual, and reaching its apotheosis in Hitler's Germany.

The dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism, whatever the labels, is overly simple and cannot stand. In most of these pairings, the ethnic category is a catch-all for all forms of nationalism or national identity that are not clearly contractual, civic, and liberal. In particular, it combines two very different conceptions of national identity:

ethnic-racial, on the one hand, and cultural, on the other. The reader may or may not have noted that "nation" is missing from the list of some forty-eight possible sources of identity on p. 27. The reason is that while national identity was at times in the West the highest from of identity, it also has been a derived identity whose intensity comes from other sources. National identity usually but not always includes a territorial element and may also include one or more ascriptive (race, ethnicity), cultural (religion, language), and political (state, ideology) elements, as well as occasionally economic (farming) or social (networks) ones.

The principal theme of this book is the continuing centrality of Anglo-Protestant culture to American national identity. The term "culture," however, has many meanings. Probably most often, it is used to refer to the cultural products of a society, including both its "high" culture of art, literature, and music and its "low" culture of popular entertainments and consumer preferences. Culture in this book means something different. It refers to a people's language, religious beliefs, social and political values, assumptions as to what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, and to the objective institutions and behavioral patterns that reflect these subjective elements. To cite one example, discussed in Chapter 4: Overall, more Americans are in the labor force and work longer hours, have shorter vacations, get less in unemployment, disability, and retirement benefits, and retire later, than people in comparable societies. Overall, Americans also take greater pride in their work, tend to view leisure with ambivalence and at times guilt, disdain those who do not work, and see the work ethic as a key ele-

ment of what it means to be an American. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that this objective and subjective emphasis on work is one distinguishing characteristic of American culture, compared to those of other societies. This is the sense in which culture is used in this book.

The simple civic-ethnic duality conflates culture and ascriptive elements, which are very different. In developing his theory of ethnicity in the United States, Horace Kallen argued that however an immigrant may change, "he cannot change his grandfather." Hence ethnic identities are relatively permanent.[15] Intermarriage undermines that argument, but even more important is the distinction between ancestry and culture. One cannot change one's grandparents, and in that sense one's ethnic heritage is given. Similarly, one cannot change one's skin color, although the perceptions of what that color means may change. One can, however, chance one's culture. People convert from one religion to another, learn new languages, adopt new values and beliefs, identify with new symbols, and accommodate themselves to new ways of life. The culture of a younger generation often differs along many of these dimensions from that of the previous generation. At times the cultures of whole societies can change dramatically. Both before and after World War II, Germans and Japanese defined their national identities overwhelmingly in ascriptive, ethnic terms. Their defeat in that war, however, changed one central element of their cultures. The two most militaristic countries in the world in the 1930s were transformed into two of the most pacifist countries. Cultural identity is fungible; ethnicancestral identity is not. Hence a clear distinction has to be maintained between the two.

The relative importance of the elements of national identity varies with the historical experiences of the people. Often one source will tend to be preeminent. German identity includes linguistic and other cultural elements but was defined by a 1913 law ascriptively in terms of descent. Germans are people who have German parents. As a result, contemporary descendants of eighteenth-century German migrants to Russia are considered German. If they migrate to Germany, they automatically receive German citizenship although the German they speak, if they speak any, may be unintelligible to their compatriots, and their customs may seem alien to native Germans. In contrast, before 1999 third-generation descendants of Turkish immigrants to Germany, who grew up and were educated in Germany, worked in Germany, and spoke fluent colloquial German, faced serious obstacles to becoming German citizens.

In the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, national identity was defined politically by their communist ideologies and communist regimes. These countries included peoples of different nationalities, which were defined culturally and accorded official recognition. For a century and a half after 1789, on the other hand, the French were divided politically into "two Frances" of *movement* and *l'ordre établi*, who differed fundamentally on whether France should accept or reject the results of the French Revolution. French identity was instead defined culturally. Immigrants who adopted French mores and ways of life and, most importantly, spoke French perfectly were accepted as French. In contrast to German law, French law provided that anyone born in France of foreign parents was automatically a

French citizen. By 1993, however, the French had become concerned about whether children of Muslim North African immigrants were being absorbed into French culture and changed the law to require French-born children of immigrants to apply for citizenship before their eighteenth birthday. This restriction was eased in 1998 to allow children born in France to foreign parents automatically to become French citizens at age eighteen if they had lived in France for five of the previous seven years.

The relative salience of different components of national identity may change. In the late twentieth century both Germans and French generally rejected the authoritarian components that had been part of their history and made democracy part of their self-concept. In France, the Revolution triumphed; in Germany, Nazism was expurgated. With the end of the Cold War, Russians became divided over their identity, with only a minority continuing to embrace communist ideology, some wanting a European identity, others espousing a cultural definition involving elements of Orthodoxy and pan-Slavism, and still others giving primacy to a territorial concept of Russia as primarily a Eurasian society. Germany, France, and the Soviet Union/Russia thus historically emphasized different components in their national identity, and the relative salience of some components shifted over time. The same is true for other countries, including America.

Notes

1. Karmela Liebkind, *Minority Identity and Identification Processes: A Social Psychological Study: Maintenance and Reconstruction of*

Ethnolinguistic: Identity in Multiple Group AllegianceI (Helsinki, Societas Scientiarium Fennica, 1984), p. 42; Erik H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1968), p. 9, and quoted by Leon Wieseltier, "Against Identity," New Republic, 28 November 1994, p. 24; Wieseltier, *Against Identity* (New York, W. Drenttel, 1996), and *Kaddish* (New York, Knopf, 1998).

2. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 59.

3. Liebkind, Minority Identity and Identification Processes, p. 51, citing Henri Tajfel, Interindividual Behaviour and Intergroup Bahaviour," in Tajfel, ed., "Differentiation Between Social Groups Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations," European Monograph in Social Psychology, 14 (London, Academic Press, 1978), p. 27-60.

4. Committee on International Relations, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, US and Them: The Psychology of Ethnonationalism (New York, Brunner/Mazel, 1987), p. 115.

5. *Ibid.*; Jonathan Mercer, Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization*, 49 (Spring 1995), p. 250.

6. Josef Goebbels, quoted in Jonathan Mercer, "Approaching Hate: The Cognitive Foundations of Discrimination," CISAC (Stanford University, January, 1994), p. 1; André Malraux, Man's Fate (New York, Random House, 1969), p. 3, cited by Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, 273 (February 1994), p. 72; Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, "Why War?," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London, Hogart Press, 1964), p. 199-215.

7. Vamik D. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach," *Political Psychology*, 6 (June 1985), p. 219, 243, 247; Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships* (Northvale, N.J., J.

Aronson, 1994), p. 35; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, Free Press, 1992), p. 162-77.

8. Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," p. 242; Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies," p. 231; Dennis Wrong, *The Problem of Order, What Unites and Divides Society* (New York, Free Press, 1994), p. 203–4; *Economist*, 7 July 1990, p. 29. The form this discrimination takes way, however, be shaped by culture. Mercer, "Approaching Hate," p. 4-6,8,11, citing Margaret Wetherell, "Cross-Cultural Studies of Minimal Groups: Implications for the Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Relations," in Henri Tajfel, ed., *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 220-21; Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York, Basic Books, 1984), p. 110–12; Michael A Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes* (New York, Routledge, 1988), p. 49.

9. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies," p. 243-44.

10. Committee on International Relations, *Us and Them*, p. 19. See also Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*, p. 88, 94-95, 103.

11. Michael Howard, "War and the Nation-State," *Daedalus*, 108 (Fall 1979), p. 102.

12. R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow, From Dynastic to National War," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 18.

13. Linda Colley, *Britons, Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992), p. 5.

14. For statements of these distinctions, see William B. Cohen, "Nationalism in Europe," in John Bodnar, *Bonds of Affection, Americans Define Their Patriotism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 323-38; Thomas M. Franck, "Tribe, Nation, World: Self-Identification in the Evolving International System," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 11 (1997), p. 151-69; Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London, Penguin, 1991), p. 11-14, 79ff; Hans Kohn, *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History* (Princeton, Van Nos-

trand, 1965); Alan Patten, "The Autonomy Argument for Liberal Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism*, 5 (January 1999), p. 1ff; Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), Introduction; Tom Nairn, "Breakwaters of 2000: From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism," *New Left Review*, 214 (November/December 1995) p. 91-103; Bernard Yack, "The Myth of the Civil Nation," *Critical Review*, 10 (Spring 1996), p. 193ff; Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*, p. 85, who summarizes Orwell's view as nationalism is "patriotism turned sour."

A 2003 sophisticated empirical study provides convincing evidence that national pride comes in two forms: "patriotism," which is defined in civic terms as "self-referential," noncompetitive love of country, and "beliefs in the *social system* and *values* of one's country", and "nationalism," defined as "inherently *comparative*"—and almost exclusively downwardly comparative." Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Zachary Elkins, "Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride," *American Journal of Political Science*, 47 (January 2003), p. 171-88. This study does not provide evidence as to how those who are patriotic feel when they compare, as they must, their country to other countries. Nor does it come to grips with the fact that in a globalizing world intercountry interactions and comparisons are increasingly frequent and unavoidable. Annual surveys now regularly rate countries on the extent to which they are free, have a free press, are corrupt, are productive, are globalized, provide effective schooling, and on other dimensions. How much national pride does a "patriot" have if his country ranks badly on most of these?

15. Horace M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1924), p. 94.