# Imperialism, Cosmopolitanism and Belonging

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Global projections of US power are at the same time imperialist and neoliberal. They combine attempts to reshape semiautonomous nation-states, to derive national advantages for the US, and to promote global capitalism. Some US leaders express ambitions to spread democracy, and it is important not merely to dismiss or debunk these but to demand demonstrations of honest commitment. When hegemonic powers use the language of democracy and popular will it is easy to be cynical but more productive to try to seize what openings this provides. At the same time, it is important to recognize that a new assertion of imperial power is not simply a return to some "pre-Westphalian" order, as though for 350 years the world has been neatly and peacefully ordered by nation-states. Nationalism and imperialism have been more mutually connected and interdependent than that. And finally, it is important to recognize that cosmopolitanism can be as much the project of neoliberalism as of cultural creativity or human rights, that global citizenship is extremely inegalitarian, and that national and local structures of belonging still matter a great deal. We need not em-

brace nationalism uncritically to see that nation-states still provide the contexts of everyday solidarities and most people's life projects; they still are they primary arenas for democratic public life; and they are focal points for resistance to imperialism.

## Imperial America

From the very beginning of any exploration of America's alleged new empire, it is worth recalling that there truly was (and to a considerable extent still is) an "old" American empire. There is a reason the Marine Hymn rings out "from the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli." This is not a celebration of successful defense of the continental United States, but of the invasion of Mexico and the defeat of the Barbary pirates off the coast of Libya–in the early 19th century. The United States did not join in the later 19th century European "race for Africa" (though it did create a quasi-imperial dependency in Liberia, organized under the complicated agendas of the "return" of Black Americans to the continent from which their ancestors were enslaved and the importation of rubber from Firestone plantations). But the US was active in acquiring overseas territories during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Most of the overseas territories the United States ruled were in the Americas or the Pacific. The Philippines offers perhaps the preeminent exemplar; Puerto Rico and Guam are among the enduring legacies of US overseas expansion. The US was also active during the same time period in "imperial diplomacy," orga-

nized to open ports and secure free trade, but also to secure positions of power amid the empires of others. The "opening" of Japan and the insistence on rights to trade in Hong Kong and China were parts of the same policy-formation as the conquest of the Philippines; it would be misleading to think of the US as always a "national" rather than an "imperial" power, simply committed to open access economic globalization. And closer to the US itself, much the same goes for US dealings with Cuba (and with Spain over Cuba).

And all these examples of overseas acquisitions leave out the most dramatic extensions of US imperial power, those exercised on the North American continent itself. The US did not simply "expand" Westward. It ruled for varying lengths of time territories and populations it did not immediately seek to integrate into a common national framework. It fought Mexico to determine whose imperium would incorporate what has now become the US Southwest. It ruled Native American populations as alien nations, and exploited their territories as ruthlessly as Spain ever seized wealth from Latin American lands. It acquired imperial domains by purchase, from Louisiana to Alaska, as well as by war. Acquisition of Hawaii was precipitated by non-governmental mission and commercial activity–as indeed the quasi-private East India Company and a range of missionary groups drove British acquisition of India and other Asian colonies.

Eventually, the US chose the path of integrating most of its imperial territories into its national political structure. It

was not always clear this would be the outcome, however, and we should recall that the formal integration of Alaska and Hawaii as states dates from less than fifty years ago. And of course there remain several overseas territories still ruled by the US government, whose trajectories may yet lead to statehood, or independence, or indefinite continuation of separate structures of dominion. Puerto Rico is the most prominent.

This intertwining of national and imperial structures is not unique to the United States. It is true for all the great imperial powers of the modern era. Benedict Anderson has argued that the distinctively modern way of imagining national communities originated in Spain's Latin American colonies.[1] It was not at home in Spain–still a feudal monarchy–that nationalism grew but in the colonies where commoners and aristocrats alike could seek to make fortunes as administrators of overseas territories, their careers shaped by movement within the domains of different colonial governments. British and French identities were forged not just domestically but imperially.

All this is less evident than it might be because of the extent to which "empire" was cast as the bad other to the emerging European nation-state system, condemned as a form of government for Europe itself even while it was rationalized as a form for European rule elsewhere. Empire was an object of debate throughout its heyday, with the extent to which domestic populations were ruled with comparable force to those abroad being a recurrent issue. The

British Empire was for the most part successfully "sold" to Britons at home, who embraced their imperial identity at the same time that they developed a national identity (and a national identity that transcended divisions along the lines of English "internal colonization" of Scotland and Wales, and even to some extent Ireland).[2] France alternated between periods when it was formally constituted as an empire and as a republic. But La République was always also imperial. The National Assembly refused to allow the 1789 Revolution to extend to Haiti and harshly suppressed the supporters of Toussaint L'Ouverture. It was Republican France that sent the future Emperor Napoleon in to Egypt and sanctioned his creation of an imperial dependency (albeit one with institutions that bore stylized resemblance to those of republican France). The very prominence of republican ideology in France's domestic politics obscured the continuity of empire in its international affairs. Indeed, part of the trauma many young French intellectuals experienced in coming to terms with the Algerian War in 1960 was the recognition that it was carried out by the Republic (which they had invested with different hopes and values).

More generally, critique of empire was fused not only with republican ideology but European accounts of the abuses of power in empires to the "East."[3] Indeed, notions of unbridled imperial power have informed the very distinction of East from West throughout the modern period. Ronald Reagan's attacks on the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" were informed not only by Star Wars movies but by

a tradition stretching back to Montesquieu and beyond (whether he knew it or not). Empire was the "bad other" to emerging republican, national, and democratic theories and self-understandings.

This history echoes through contemporary discussions of epochal transformation, crises of the state, and prospects for cosmopolitanism global order. During the 1990s it became commonplace to assert the end of the "Post-Westphalian Era" or the arrival of a "Postnational Constellation." The historical referents for this were illusory, however. After all, it is not as though the Treaty of Westphalia signed at the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 ushered in 350 years of peace and harmony, or even order. Nor is it the case that the world was simply and neatly structured in terms of nation-states throughout that period. On the contrary, it would make more sense to say that the nation-state *project* dominated after 1648. It was a project of aligning territory, economy, government, and culture. The alignments were never perfect and to the extent achieved were the products of both material and symbolic violence as well as of new systems of communications and transport, access to common education, vernacular language literatures, and mass participation in public affairs.

Not only did empire coexist with nation throughout this period, the existence of an "order" based on the sovereignty of nation-states was a fiction that enabled the construction of certain alliances, practices, and organizations. That it was not simply a description is signaled by the unparalleled violence, war, and disorder of the era. But of course the con-

flicts were organized differently than they would have been had empire remained the ascendant form of polity. And so was much else besides, including not least capitalism which developed largely in structures of competition among nation-states.[4] Though there was no clear-cut military triumph in the Thirty Years War, to a considerable extent the peace that ended it was a defeat for empire–represented by Spain and the Holy Roman Empire–and brought about by powers that would increasingly style themselves and organize themselves as nation-states, notably France and Sweden.

In this transition, empire got perhaps a worse name than it deserved. That new nationalist projects–including not least the founding of new countries and revolutions in old–were themselves rebellions against empires may have led to exaggeration of the negatives and neglect of the positives in empire. Empires, for example, were at least sometimes and in important ways more cosmopolitan and tolerant than nation-states. Genocide, after all, was typically carried out by nationalists not emperors. And conversely, it was easy to miss the complicity of nationalism and democracy, the extent to which the latter depended on strong claims as to the identity of "the people" provided by the former. Whatever their other failings, modern democracy has flourished largely in nation-states (though democracy has not always proved an unalloyed good, or a government system able to secure other goods).

At the same time, empire was associated with unbridled power, and reference to empire came enduringly to connote massive concentrations of power (as indeed empires might

seem from the perspective of national liberation movements). Yet this too could be misleading, for it was in large part the weakness of empires which was revealed in the Thirty Years War and in numerous conflicts thereafter. Because empire has been to such an extent the "bad other" to modern republican and democratic projects, the very strength of imperial rule is often exaggerated. Yet "David and Goliath" stories of the victories of seemingly weak nations over seemingly mighty empires abound, and are also instructive.

The distinction of nation from empire is not merely a neutral description of contrasting institutional forms. It is an ideologically charged political contrast. And it is informed by different implicit and explicit empirical examples. Empires exist in a community of interpretation. One of the most important lineages of such interpretation considers Egypt, Alexandrine Hellas, Rome and then its split of East and West. This yielded Byzantium, which in turn gave way to the Ottoman Empire which was also influenced by the Persian Empire (which itself had roots back to struggles with Greece even before Alexander). Mughal India traced roots to Persia but also understood itself in relation to the whole series. And if the Holy Roman Empire was less exemplary in the West than its Eastern counterparts, it was still part of a series that went on to inform Spanish, Austro-Hungarian, Portuguese, French, British, and Prussian Empires. Later emperors and officials in their administrations looked back not only at their direct predecessors but at a range of others

in assessing possible policies and developing visions of what amounted to good imperial rule. Not all the worlds empires figure in these lists, however. China is notably absent (though it is part of a community of imperial norms and interpretation with the short-lived but influential Mongolian Empires and Japan (as well as kingdoms in Korea, Vietnam and elsewhere). And indeed, China is in many was not typical of "empire" as it has been understood in the tradition of interpretation reaching back to Egypt and centered on Rome. However much it appeared as one empire among others to outsiders, it did not conceive of itself as on the "interimperial" model by which empires generally recognized each other. Japan grew first within the Chinese field of interpretation, made its own decisive innovations, but also later developed a stronger sense of itself as one empire among others around the world than China did, and was more directly influenced by Western empires in particular. Some African empires were also largely outside the interpretative community, but not all. Ethiopia certainly understood itself in relationship both to the ancient lineage back to Egypt and Rome, and also in relationship to other later Christian Empires (including the Portuguese well before the Italian). Islamic Empires traced a partially overlapping lineage with more emphasis on the "medieval" Arab empires.

Rome perhaps bequeathed the most influential example to political theory, but it was also a biased one in an important sense. There is almost no discussion of the Roman Empire that is not shaped by a contrast to the Roman Repu-

blic. The Republic is held to exemplify a purity and nobility lost in the Empire, whatever the grandeur of the latter. Gibbon offers an archetype of the tradition. It is easy to elide the contrast empire/republic with that of empire/nation, but this is not, in fact, how the Romans understood matters. In the former contrast, both terms are essentially political; they describe modes of political organization. In the latter, an encompassing political organization is contrasted to one of the sorts of units it either incorporated or struggled with on its borders. "Nation," as Geary has recently suggested, was the Roman term for non-Romans who were organized into groups by common descent and culture–what we might now call ethnicity.[5] Gauls and Goths were nations; Romans were not. And the properly political organization of belonging was citizenship, which necessarily overrode membership in nations. In any event, thinking "empire" in terms of Rome tends to focus attention on citizenship, and perhaps on the idea of the *pax romana*.

Citizenship is not usually in the foreground of considerations of the Chinese empire.[6] But it is not irrelevant. China, like the US, consolidated rule over a continent; unification was in a sense the telos of both state-building projects (and expansion off the home continent was secondary for both). China's insularity, especially from the Ming dynasty forward, exceeded any isolationism that ever become actual policy in the United States, but here too the likeness is suggestive. In each case, but again perhaps more strikingly in the case of China, the pursuit of unity and a common culture

were important. In both, but especially in China, this always centered on elite culture. The existence of a common literate and political elite knit together otherwise disparate provinces, states, and territories (and it is worth recalling that day to day engagement with national politics was hardly as extensive in the US as the nostalgia of later critics of declining civic culture tend to suggest).[7] In each case there were exceptions–like Tibet in modern Chinese history–that remind us of the extent to which it is appropriate to speak of empire even though in both cases empire co-existed with a national state at least much of the time. Of course there were also major and telling differences. That the US saw growing popular political participation (even during the same 19th century when China clamped down on many rebellions) is instructive. So too is the enormous importance of immigration in the American story but not in the Chinese.

Empires always co-existed with other, less encompassing and usually smaller-scale polities. The extent to which imperial centers were able to impose effective rule over their nominal territories varied, as did the extent to which they could demand tribute from those on their peripheries. The generalization that empires over-reach, or at least that over-reaching is their undoing needs a qualification. Many were never undone, they rather ebbed and flowed with the fortunes of dynasties and the shifting balance between military expansionists, commercial elites, and other interests.

As we suggested above, the "age of empires" did not end all at once with the rise of nationalism or the growth of capitalism. Empire continued, intertwined with both. But

each did introduce important innovations that would structure contrasts with empire throughout the modern era. Perhaps most notable was the ideology of self-determination. Closely related to the growth of modern individualism and changes in political subjectivity, this also reshaped thinking about legitimacy. Political and economic interests were joined in the idea of "commonwealth" and new attempts to ground claims to legitimate rule in benefits to subjects. In a new community of interpretation, at first mainly in Western Europe, empire (and often monarchy) appeared as bad others to republics and eventually democracies. Coupled with the growth of domestic communication and cultural integration, this way of thinking also reinforced nationalism and the notion of a prepolitical collective subject deserving of self-determination. Not least of all, this joined with ideas of development to present nations as subjects of historical maturation–an idea that would be influential in European self-reflection but perhaps even more in the growth of "developmentalism" as part of imperial projects of colonial administration.

Empire was clearly a project of European expansion through most of the modern era. But it was not always state led expansion. A variety of private and quasi-private organizational forms developed to profit from exploration, trade, and empire. Empire to some extent drove the creation of the modern business enterprise (as John Kelly has documented). But at the same time empires also responded to crises, sought stabilization and the minimization of disruptions and

dangers as much as they sought new territories. Citizens, and eventually companies, pulled imperial administrators into issues created by their projects of economic gain. Empire clearly contributed to capital formation in Western Europe, but it is not clear that it was always profitable for imperial states.

Indeed, Empire was among other things an occasion for a redistribution of wealth within imperial countries. In both absolute and relative terms, it changed the pattern of who was rich, who paid taxes, and who was pressed into personal service of one kind or another. And this, like many other issues, is on the table in evaluating contemporary global extensions of US power. Empire is as big an issue for domestic political and economic affairs as for international ones.

Another way in which the image of the Westphalian Era (or its end) can mislead is to imply too much of a trade off between national autonomy and multilateralism. In fact, projects of multilateral global governance are typically rooted in Westphalian notion of nation-states as sovereign parties to international agreements. And there has been a huge recent growth in such agreements–despite US unilateralism during the last couple of decades. It is not just the League of Nations and then United Nations–the latter far more substantial than the former–that define this. It is also the host of special purpose regulatory regimes, agencies, and agreements. From Interpol to the International Red Cross, a variety of organizations have been created on the model of national membership–whether the national members are

themselves structured as NGOs or branches of the state. And many of the major advances of "globalization" are themselves made possible only by such state-based but multilateral agreements. The Internet, for example, is not simply a product of technology but also of regulatory agreements. The same was true earlier for international postal, telegraph and telephone service and the same is true for other apparently less material domains like intellectual property rights. This system is under enormous pressure and may indeed come apart or be replaced by another. But it would be a mistake to imagine that the status quo at any time in the last century was simply one of autonomous nation-states or that the growth of global integration was not in large part mediated by those states (or at least some of them).

Current global projections of US power unsettle both the relative autonomy of other states and the functioning of structures of multilateral relations. But this doesn't automatically make US power a matter of political empire. In the first place, the US seems clearly engaged in promoting a version of economic globalization which still relies on at least semi-autonomous states. This globalization is ideologically presented as a sort of inexorable natural development, but of course it is in fact made possible by specific institutional structures that give it specific shape and consequences–including dramatic inequality. And as the US seeks to put "suitable" new structures in place, it creates a situation–notably in Iraq–that resembles in many ways the late "decolonization" or "developmental" phase of the great Eu-

ropean empires.[8] Talk of nation-building and exit strategies especially suggest this.

It is a mistake to see the resulting global arrangements as a seamless whole free from internal contradictions and choices. The sense of empire offered by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri comes close to this.[9] And this is not only dispiriting because it suggests few levers for significant change. It is wrong about some of the actual working of the global system.

Campaigners against corporate globalization often see all the major multilateral organizations and agreements as simply part of the imperial-capitalist system. This misses, though, the differences between multilateral agreements and institutions like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and bilateral agreements. The US may be hegemonic in the multilateral arenas, but the very maintenance of its hegemony implies participation in quasi-juridical structures that both limit its unilateral power and provide occasions for visible and even influential dissent (such as that Brazil led within the WTO). By contrast, the Bush administration has often preferred globalization by bilateral agreements. In these it can exercise more lopsided power and more readily profit from dividing its partners.

The pressure to compete globally is commonly presented as a compulsion to domestic audiences. There is no choice but to adapt, citizens are told–linking contemporary globalization ironically to 19th century "imperialism" which

also presented a competitive scramble as compulsory. And the terms of this competition are highly unequal. In this contexts states have contradictory potential. They can be the key organizing arenas for democratic resistance, or they can be–as they more often are–the central mechanisms for imposing market discipline on populations (not to mention raising militaries for enforcement of international order).

Capitalism demands rule of law, a fiscal infrastructure, communications and transport systems, containment (though not elimination) of war, and access to markets. Empire is a possible approach to meeting the demands of a capitalist globalization, but it is not the only approach and should not simply be elided with capitalism. Indeed it is arguable that what are often called the imperial projects of the United States are less efforts to extend political rule internationally than efforts to "manage" global affairs. The United States shows little inclination to make enduring commitments to Afghanistan or Iraq. Rather, each intervention seems to reflect a managerial orientation towards threats and emergencies. In each case the primary focus seems to be containment of potential damage to US interests. But each intervention also pursues a longer-term agenda of restructuring local and regional relations in a way that will allow for the trade relations in which the US is hegemonic but not require enduring US rule. They may serve the interests of capital at the same time. But it is worth noting that this managerial orientation towards international affairs is not at all unique to the US government. It is shared with many other states and indeed

with much of the global NGO community (including parts actively hostile to the Bush administration and American power). Humanitarian interventions may be much more attractive than pre-emptive wars, but they share this managerial orientation.

A key question is whether political and military domination is necessary to such managerial projects. The implication that it is necessary runs through not only government policy decisions but a considerable part of the popular discourse about empire. Most of the prominent claims about empire have a tendentious and often ideological character. There are admirers who call on the US to assume its imperial role more enthusiastically,[10] republicans anxious about the implications of empire for the domestic American polity,[11] liberals aghast at the idea the US might pursue an imperial policy,[12] and radicals who offer so all-encompassing an account that the present is held to be like no past because global empire has neither center nor outside.[13]

It is important to avoid speciously treating empire as somehow always distinct from nation-states, and to recognize that it is not merely an archaic political form that nation-states supplanted. Empire has been pursued by leaders of countries simultaneously mobilizing their domestic populations on the basis of nationalism. And democratic-national rebellions have not always demanded an end to empire. At the same time, the exercise of what many regard as imperial force by the United States is a rebuke to those who imagined that moving "beyond the nation-state" would mean moving

into an era of easy cosmopolitan democracy. Such thought flourished especially in the 1990s. It perhaps overestimated the extent to which economic globalization was mirrored by effective capacities for "subaltern" forces to mobilize across national boundaries. It overestimated the capacities for effective action available to most individuals outside a fairly narrow cosmopolitan elite.[14] It almost certainly underestimated the extent to the extent to which states still mattered–whether to the stabilization of the global order or to the possibilities for democratic struggles within and sometimes against it. And it underestimated the extent to which a decline in state capacities in some places would be an invitation to powerful states elsewhere to attempt to remake the world in their own interests. And, sadly, it underestimated the vulnerability of the United Nations to a clash among powerful and less powerful states, some projecting imperial might and others protecting more specifically national interests and projects. While some political theorists proposed schemes for making the UN the institutional basis of a cosmopolitan system of global governance, the UN was in fact suffering deeply from both its own constitutional contradictions–not least as an organization of national states, but also as an organization deriving most of its budget from special appeals to a minority of its richer members rather than from any stable budgetary source.

Equally, it is important not to underestimate nationalism. In its most pervasive forms it is often not noticed. Analysts focused on eruptions of violence, waves of racial

or ethnic discrimination, and mass social movements, fail to see both the everyday nationalism that organizes people's sense of belonging in the world and to particular states, and the methodological nationalism that leads historians to organize history as stories in or of nations and social scientists to approach comparative research with data sets in which the units are almost always nations. It is important not to start inquiries into nationalism by selecting only its most extreme or problematic forms for attention. Equally, it is important not to imagine it as exceptional, about to vanish, a holdover from an earlier era lacking in contemporary basis; it is hardly good scholarship to wish nationalism away.[15]

For one thing, it is often called forth by imperialism, produced in response. Nationalism flourishes as much because of perceived outside threats as because of internal sympathies and solidarities. But nationalism in itself is hardly the solution to most of the challenges facing people today; it is a reflection of loyalty to certain identities, states, and fellow-citizens that may help to mobilize people for good or ill.

What either nations or empires can achieve and what are the distinctive ways in which imperial projects go wrong are important questions that take us from historical examples into contemporary debates. But we need to ask not only about the implications for good or ill of possibly imperial projections of US power. We need to ask also, what else is happening? That is, what are the other major trends in the organization of the world that are more or less obscured

from the news by US projections of global power and attacks on the US? One might point, for example, to Asian growth and integration. While the US is preoccupied with its (both radical and limited) capacity to project its power in the Middle East, trade and new political and economic agreements are integrating Asia in an unprecedented way. Growth in intra-Asian trade has exceeded that with the rest of the world for most of the 1990s and since. Students choose more often to study at universities in neighboring Asian countries. Joint venture firms link Taiwanese computer manufacturers with Indian software developers. The Asian rise is not without its links to the Middle East or to American power–witness China's simultaneously enormous and growing dependence on imported oil and its massive purchases of US government debt. But it may well be that America's sacrifice of "soft power" to "hard," its preference for imperial force rather than cultural hegemony, means precisely that it has become the guarantor of the (all but invisible Middle Eastern peace and stability) at the expense of being able to play the hegemon over Asia.

Joseph Nye has argued more generally that the US prefers force to soft power at its peril.[16] Immanuel Wallerstein has gone considerably further in arguing not just that American hegemony is in danger but that American power is already in sharp decline.[17] Wallerstein sees this as an all but inevitable reflection of long waves in the global economy. Whether this is right or not, it is worth considering the wide range of issues the US seems more or less powerless to ad-

dress–even while it has massive military force. It may be that the kinds of force the US can deploy are simply not commensurate with the kinds of threats it faces.

Think for example of what might be termed the "dark side of globalization." I refer not just to "terrorism" but all the other issues from which the alleged war on terror deflects attention: AIDS, environmental damage, hazardous waste exports, trafficking in women, drug trade, small arms trade (and pretty big arms trade). Think of the massive migration flows and the efforts to regulate or block some of these that themselves become huge disruptions in individual and family lives–and potentially huge costs for hegemons forsaking the "soft power" of offering their schools and corporate employers to "citizens of the world." Think of the problematic condition of public communication, the difficulties of media regulation for commerce and states, the concentrations of media power (not just in Western corporations but in a small number of would-be counter-hegemonic communications systems).

Faced with all these problems, many have hoped for an alternative to both nationalism and imperialism; it is most commonly dubbed "cosmopolitanism." This is, I think, in many ways commendable. But it is prone to illusions. First, it is easy to forget the extent to which nationalism flourished in cities where citizens had little political power–notably the metropoles of great empires. Conversely, it is easy to forget how much democracy and nationalism grew hand in hand. This was not all good, since it could produce the tyranny of

majorities, but it was true. We need a cosmopolitan orientation in relation to nationalism and imperialism–and indeed global capitalism. But we need to stop short of imagining that it is in some sense a "solution" to the problems they pose.

## The Social Bases of Cosmopolitanism

"To belong or not to belong," asks Ulrich Beck, "that is the cosmopolitan question."[18] Indeed perhaps it is, but if so, one of the most crucial things it reveals about cosmopolitanism is that some people are empowered to ask the question with much more freedom and confidence than others. Another is the extent to which cosmopolitanism is conceptualized as the absence of particularism rather than a positive form of belonging.

Oddly, Beck asks the question in a paper devoted to "the analysis of global inequality." His agenda is to focus our attention on the "big inequalities" between rich and poor nations. These, he suggests, dwarf inequalities within nations. There is much to this, though it oversimplifies empirical patterns of inequality. Beck is certainly right that "It is surprising how the big inequalities which are suffered by humanity can be continuously legitimized through a silent complicity between the state authority and the state-obsessed social sciences by means of a form of organized non-perception".[19] But what he doesn't consider is the extent to which participation in a superficially multinational cosmopolitan elite is basic to the reproduction of that

non-perception. The elites of "poor" countries who participate in global civil society, multilateral agencies, and transnational business corporations not only make money their compatriots can barely imagine but make possible the cosmopolitan illusion of elites from rich countries. This is the illusion that their relationships with fellow cosmopolitans truly transcend nation and culture and place. Cosmopolitan elites too often misrecognize transnational class formation as the escape from belonging.

Elsewhere, I have analyzed the "class consciousness of frequent travelers" that underwrites this misrecognition.[20] I mean to call attention not just to the elite occupational status of those who form the archetypal image of the cosmopolitans, but to the grounding certain material privileges give to the intellectual position. "Good" passports and easy access to visa, international credit cards and membership in airline clubs, invitations from conference organizers and organizational contacts all facilitate a kind of inhabitation (if not necessarily citizenship) of the world as an apparent whole. To be sure, diasporas provide for other circuits of international connectivity, drawing on ethnic and kin connections rather than the more bureaucratically formalized ones of businesspeople, academics, and aid workers. But though these are real, they face significantly different contextual pressures.

Post 9/11 restrictions on visas–let alone immigration–reveal the differences between those bearing European and American passports and most others in the world. The former hardly notice the change and mover nearly freely as

before. The latter find their international mobility sharply impeded and sometimes blocked. Or else they find it to be forced–as for example thousands who have made lives and put down roots in America are deported each year, sometimes, especially children born in the US, to "homes" they barely know or even have never inhabited. European intellectuals like Georgi Agamben might cancel lecture engagements to protest the exercise of "biopower" by a US administration eager to print, scan, and type any visitor. But his cosmopolitan challenge to a regrettable national regime–however legitimate–is altogether different from the unchosen circumstances of those who migrated to make a better life, did so, and had it snatched from them.[21]

The global border control regime thus encourages a sense of natural cosmopolitanism for some and reminds others of their nationality (and often of religion and ethnicity as well). However cosmopolitan their initial intentions or self-understandings, these Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans are reminded by the ascriptions and restrictions with which they are confronted that at least certain sorts of cosmopolitanism are not for them. Normative cosmopolitans can (and do) assert that this is not the way the world should be, and that borders should be more open. But they need also to take care not to deny the legitimacy of any anti-cosmopolitan responses people may have to this regime of borders, including not just resentment but renewed identification with nations and even projects of national development which hold

out the prospect of enabling them to join the ranks of those with good passports.

The point is not simply privilege. It is that a sense of connection to the world as a whole, and of being a competent actor on the scale of "global citizenship" is not merely a matter of the absence of more local ties. It has its own material and social conditions. Moreover, the cosmopolitan elites are hardly culture-free; they do not simply reflect the rational obligations of humanity in the abstract (even if their theories try to).

To some extent, the cosmopolitan elite culture is a product of Western dominance and the kinds of intellectual orientations it has produced. It reflects "modernity" which has its own historical provenance. "This revenant late liberalism reveals, in a more exaggerated form, a struggle at the heart of liberal theory, where a genuine desire for equality as a universal norm is tethered to a tenacious ethnocentric provincialism in matters of cultural judgment and recognition."[22] But the cultural particularity is not simply inheritance, and not simply a reflection of (mainly) Western modernity. It is also constructed out of the concrete conditions of cosmopolitan mobility, education, and participation in certain versions of news and other media flows. It is the culture of those who attend Harvard and the LSE, who read *The Economist* and *Le Monde*, who recognize Mozart's music as universal, and who can discuss the relative merits of Australian, French, and Chilean wines. It is also a culture in which secularism seems natural and religion odd, and in which res-

pect for human rights is assumed but the notion of fundamental economic redistribution is radical and controversial. This culture has many good qualities, as well as blindspots, but nonetheless it is culture and not its absence.

Martha Nussbaum and some other "extreme" cosmopolitans, present cosmopolitanism first and foremost as a kind of virtuous deracination, a liberation from the possibly illegitimate and in any case blinkering attachments of locality, ethnicity, religion, and nationality.[23] But like secularism, cosmopolitanism is a presence not an absence, an occupation of particular positions in the world, not a view from nowhere or everywhere. All actually existing cosmopolitanisms, to be more precise, reflect influences of social location and cultural tradition. The ways in which any one opens to understanding or valuing of others are specific and never exhaust all the possible ways. Secularism is again instructive. The parameters of specific religious traditions shape the contours of what is considered not religious, nor not the domain of specific religions. The not-specifically-religious, thus, is never a simple embodiment of neutrality. What is "secular" in relation to multiple Christian denominations may not be exactly equivalent to what is secular in the context of Hindu or Muslim traditions (let alone of their intermingling and competition). So too, cosmopolitan transcendence of localism and parochialism is not well understood as simple neutrality towards or tolerance of all particularisms. It is participation in a particular, if potentially broad, process of cultural production and social interconnection that spans boundaries.

To say that the cosmopolitanism of most theories reflects the experience of business, academic, government, and civil society elites, thus, is not merely to point to some reasons why others may not so readily share it but also to suggest sources of its particular character. It is a neither freedom from culture nor a matter of pure individual choice, but a cultural position constructed on particular social bases and a choice made possible by both that culture and those bases. It is accordingly different from the transcendence of localism on other cultural and social bases. Cosmopolitanism has particular rather than solely universal content, thus, so its advocates sometimes fail to recognize this. Moreover, the content and the misrecognition are connected to social bases of relative privilege.

Much thinking about ethnicity and the legitimacy of local or other particularistic attachments by self-declared cosmopolitans reflects their tacit presumption of their own more or less elite position. I do not mean simply that they act to benefit themselves, or in other ways from bad motives. Rather, I mean that their construction of genuine benevolence is prejudiced against ethnic and other attachments because of the primacy of the perspective of elites. Any prejudice by elites in favor of others in their own ethnic groups or communities would amount to favoring the already privileged (a very anti-Rawlsian position). So the cosmopolitans are keen to rule out such self-benefiting particularism. But ethnic solidarity is not always a matter of exclusion by the powerful; it is often a resource for effective collective action

and mutual support among the less powerful. While it is true, in other words, that in-group solidarity by those in positions of power and influence usually amounts to discrimination against less powerful or privileged others, it is also true that solidarity serves to strengthen the weak. Indeed, those who are excluded from or allowed only weak access to dominant structures of power and discourse have especially great need to band together in order to be effective. Of course, elites also band together to protect privilege (and as Weber 1922 emphasized, exclusivity is a prominent elite weapon against the inclusive strategies of mass activists). And elites manipulate solidarities to pursue their own advantages rather than considering equally the interests of all. Nonetheless, elites are typically empowered as individuals in ways non-elites are not.

In short, when cosmopolitan appeals to humanity as a whole are presented in individualistic terms, they are apt to privilege those with the most capacity to get what they want by individual action. However well intentioned, they typically devalue the ways in which other people depend on ethnic, national, and communal solidarities–among others–to solve practical problems in their lives. And they typically neglect the extent to which asserting that cultural difference should be valued only as a matter of individual taste undermines any attempt to redistribute benefits in the social order across culturally defined groups. They can extol multiculturalism, in other words, so long as this is defined as a harmonious arrangement in all cultures are seen as attractive parts

of a mosaic, but not when members of one cultural group organize to demand that the mosaic be altered.[24]

## Liberalism and Belonging[25]

As a theme in liberal political theory, cosmopolitanism responds crucially to the focus of traditional liberalism on the relationship of individual persons to individual states (and sometimes to markets). Ideas of citizenship and rights reflect the attempt to construct the proper relationship between liberal subjects and sovereign states. The cosmopolitan theorists of the 1990s recognized problems both in how this constituted international relations as relations among such states, neglecting the many other ways in which individuals participated in a transnational or indeed nonnationally trans-state activities, and in the difficulty of accounting for why specific populations of individuals belonged in specific states.[26]

Earlier liberals had often relied at least tacitly on the idea of "nation" to give an account of why particular people belong together as the "people" of a particular state. So long as the fiction of a perfect match between nations and states was plausible, this was relatively unproblematic, though it meant liberal theory was sociologically impoverished. To their credit, the various theorists of a new cosmopolitan liberalism recognized that it was no longer tenable to rely so uncritically on the idea of nation.

The prioritization of the individual society came to seem increasingly untenable. It began to seem fundamental

and not contingent that markets and other social relations extend across nation-state borders, that migration and cultural flows challenge nationalist notions of the integral character of cultures and political communities, that states are not able to organize or control many of the main influences on the lives of their citizens, and that the most salient inequalities are intersocietally global and thus not addressed by intrasocietal measures. Accordingly, an important project for liberals was to work out how to extend their theories of justice and political legitimacy to a global scale.

A cosmopolitan attitude appeared both as a timeless good and as a specific response to current historical circumstances. The extension of markets, media, and migration has, advocates of a new cosmopolitan liberalism argue, reduced both the efficacy of states and the adequacy of moral and political analysis that approaches one "society" at a time. At the same time, "identity politics" and multiculturalism have in the eyes of many liberals been excessive and become sources of domestic divisions and illiberal appeals to special rights for different groups. Accordingly, cosmopolitan theorists argue that the "first principles" of ethical obligation and political community should stress the allegiance of each to all at the scale of humanity.

The new cosmopolitan liberals retain, however, one of the weaknesses of older forms of liberalism. They offer no strong account of social solidarity or of the role of culture in constituting human life. For the most part, they start theorizing from putatively autonomous, discrete, and cultureless

individuals. Yet it is important not to lose sight of the reality and importance of substantive solidarities–groups and identities in familiar if inadequate terms–in considering political arrangements designed to offer new combinations of incorporation and differentiation and through them to make a world of heterogeneous values, understandings, inequalities, and power structures both more peaceful and more just.[27] In other words, social solidarities are a problem for liberal cosmopolitan theory, as it is usually now conceived, but a necessity for an effective cosmopolitan global order.

Reliance on the assumption that nations were naturally given pre-political bases for states had helped older liberals to paper over the difficulty of explaining why the individuals of their theories belonged in particular states (or conversely could rightly be excluded from them). The new cosmopolitanism is generally antinationalist, seeing nations as part of the fading order of political life divided on lines of states. Its advocates rightly refuse to rely on this tacit nationalism. But as they offer no new account of solidarity save the obligations of each human being to all others, they give little weight to "belonging," to the notion that social relationships might be as basic as individuals, or that individuals exist only in cultural milieux–even if usually in several at the same time.

Indeed, much of the new liberal cosmopolitan thought proceeds as though belonging is a matter of social constraints from which individuals ideally ought to escape, or temptations to favoritism they ought to resist. Claims of spe-

cial loyalty or responsibility to nations, communities, or ethnic groups, thus, are subordinated or fall under suspicion of illegitimacy. To claim that one's self-definition, even one's specific version of loyalty to humanity, comes through membership of some such more particular solidarity is, in Martha Nussbaum's words, a "morally questionable move of self-definition by a morally irrelevant characteristic."[28]

## Conclusion

It is impossible not to belong to social groups, relations, or culture. The idea of individuals abstract enough to be able to choose all their "identifications" is deeply misleading. Versions of this idea are, however, widespread in liberal cosmopolitanism. They reflect the attractive illusion of escaping from social determinations into a realm of greater freedom, and from cultural particularity into greater universalism. But they are remarkably unrealistic, and so abstract as to provide little purchase on what the next steps of actual social action might be for real people who are necessarily situated in particular webs of belonging, with access to particular others but not to humanity in general. Treating ethnicity as *essentially* (rather than partially) a choice of identifications, they neglect the omnipresence of ascription (and discrimination) as determinations of social identities. They neglect the huge inequalities in the supports available to individuals to enter cosmopolitan intercourse as individuals (and also the ways in which certain socially distribu-

ted supports like wealth, education, and command of the English language are understood as personal achievements or attributes). And they neglect the extent to which people are implicated in social actions which they are not entirely free to choose (as, for example, I remain an American and share responsibility for the invasion of Iraq despite my opposition to it and distaste for the current US administration). Whether blame or benefit follow from such implications, they are not altogether optional.

Efforts to transcend the limits of belonging to specific webs of relationships do not involve freedom from social determinations, but transformations of social organization and relationships. Sometimes transcendence of particular solidarities involves no neat larger whole but a patchwork quilt of new connections, like those mediated historically by trading cities and still today by diasporas. But transcending local solidarities has also been paradigmatically how the growth of nationalism has proceeded, sometimes complementing but often transforming or marginalizing more local or sectional solidarities (village, province, caste, class, or tribe). Nations usually work by presenting more encompassing identities into which various sectional ones can fit. And in this it is crucial to recognize that nations have much the same relationship to pan-national or global governance projects that localities and minorities had to the growth of national states.[29]

Will Kymlicka has argued that it is important "to view minority rights, not as a deviation from ethnocultural neu-

trality, but as a response to majority nation-building."[30] In the same sense, I have suggested that it is a mistake to treat nationalism and other forms of group solidarity as a deviation from cosmopolitan neutrality. In the first place, cosmopolitanism is not neutral–though cosmopolitans can try to make both global institutions and global discourse more open and more fair. In the second place, national projects respond to global projects. They are not mere inheritances from the past, but ways–certainly very often problematic ways–of taking hold of current predicaments.

The analogy between nations faced with globalization and minorities within nation-states–both immigrants and so-called national minorities–is strong. And we can learn from Kymlicka's injunction "Fairness therefore requires an ongoing, systematic exploration of our common institutions to see whether their rules, structures and symbols disadvantage immigrants."[31] Cosmopolitanism at its best is a fight for just such fairness in the continued development of global institutions. But the analogy is not perfect, and is not perfect precisely because most immigrants (and national minorities) make only modest claims to sovereignty. Strong Westphalian doctrines of sovereignty may always have been problematic and may now be out of date. But just as it would be hasty to imagine we are embarking on a postnational era–when all the empirical indicators are that nationalism is resurgent precisely because of asymmetrical globalization–so it would be hasty to forget the strong claims to collective autonomy and self-determination of those who have

been denied both, and the need for solidarity among those who are least empowered to realize their projects as individuals. Solidarity need not always be national, and need not always develop from traditional roots. But for many of those treated most unfairly in the world, nations and traditions are potentially important resources. Confronted with the exercise of global power by both multinational corporations and the United States–whether one describes this as empire or an extension of the US national project–resistance and other responses necessarily start from local, national, and regional solidarities.

## *Notes*

1. *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, rev. ed. 1992).
2. See Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the National Identity, 1707-1837*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994, and *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850*, New York, Anchor, 2002.
3. "East" was never just a geographical category. Indeed, the far-flung former Hapsburg domains were often associated with the East (Spain's location notwithstanding), and so too of course was Germany, both as relict of the Holy Roman Empire and new quasi-imperial Reich. What was at stake was more a particular claim to constitute the West than any abstract analysis of the East.
4. This dimension of the eclipse of empire by new national forms was a central emphasis in the first volume of Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, La Jolla, Academic Books, 1974.
5. Patrick Geary, *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.
6. See Frederick Teggart's classic, if sometimes tendentious, comparison of *Rome and China*, Westport, CT, Greenwood, 1983.

7. See Michael Schudson, *The Good Citizen*, New York, Free Press, 1998.
8. Fred Cooper, "Modernizing Colonialism and the Limits of Empire," forthcoming in *Lessons of Empire*, C. Calhoun, F. Cooper, and K. Moore, eds., New York, New Press, 2005.
9. Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2001.
10. Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*, New York, Basic Books, 2003.
11. Patrick Buchanan, *Where the Right Went Wrong*, New York, Thomas Dunne Books, 2004.
12. Among the best, see Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American* Empire, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2000, and *The Sorrows of* Empire, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2004.
13. Hardt and Negri, *Empire* and Multitude, New York, Penguin, 2004,.
14. See Calhoun, "The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, v. 101, n. 4, p. 869-97, 2003.
15. See discussions in Umut Ozkirimli, ed., *Nationalism and its Futures*, London, Palgrave Macmillan 2004; Umut Ozkirimli, *Contemporary Nationalism*, London, Palgrave Macmillan 2005; Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, and "Is It Time to Be Postnational?" which appears in Candido Mendes, ed., *Hégémonie et Civilisation de la Peur*, Rio de Janeiro, EDUCAM, 2004, based on presentation at an earlier conference in this series.
16. On the distinction of soft and hard power see Joseph Nye, *Soft* Power, New York, Public Affairs, 2004.
17. Wallerstein, *The Decline of American* Power, New York, New Press, 2003.
18. "The Analysis of Global Inequality: From National to Cosmopolitan Perspective," Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier, and Marlies Glasius, eds., *Global Civil Society 2003*, Oxford, Oxford University

Press, p. 50. "The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, v. 101, n. 4, p. 869-97: 45, 2003,.

19. "The Analysis of Global Inequality: From National to Cosmopolitan Perspective," Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier, and Marlies Glasius, eds., *Global Civil Society 2003*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 50.
20. "The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, v. 101, n. 4, p. 869-97, 2003.
21. Clifford–"Traveling Cultures," in Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler, eds., *Cultural* Studies, New York, Routledge, 1992–and Brennan, *At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 16-7, both rightly raise the problems posed by using the metaphor of "travel" to think about migrant labor and displacement, a habit that has hardly disappeared, rooted perhaps in the situation of intellectuals but disturbingly inapt for many others.
22. Pollock, Sheldon, Homi Bhabha, Carol Breckenridge, and Dipesh Chakrabharty, 2000, "Cosmopolitanisms," *Public Culture*, v. 12, n. 3, p. 577-590: 5.
23. See Samuel Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, on the notion of "extreme" cosmopolitanism; and Calhoun, "Belonging in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary," *Ethnicities*, v. 3, n. 4, p. 531-53, for a discussion of different varieties of cosmopolitanism.
24. See Jon Okamura's ("The Illusion of Paradise: Privileging Multiculturalism in Hawai'I," p. 264-84, in D. C. Gladney, ed., *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Corea, China, Malaysia, Fiki, Turkey, and the United States*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) analysis of Hawaii's myth of a multicultural paradise. Whatever reality this may reflect, it also enshrines an existing distribution of power and resources. It not only encourages the idea that individuals from each cultural group should be treated

equally (as against, say, affirmative action). It especially inhibits self-organization by members of any group traditionally on the losing end–say native Hawaiians–to alter the terms of the distributive game. Such organization can only appear as hostile to the idealized multicultural harmony.

25. The arguments taken up in this section are made at more length in Calhoun ("Constitutional Patriotism and the Public Sphere: Interests, Identity, and Solidarity in the Integration of Europe," p. 275-312, in Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronin, eds., *Global Ethics and Transnational Politics*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, and "Belonging in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary").
26. Held (*Democracy and Global Order*. Cambridge, Polity, 1995) is among the most important, and among those most attention to issues of membership in a variety of overlapping associations. For anthologies that sample the debate, see Archibugi, Daniele, eds., 2003, *Debating Cosmopolitics*, London, Verso; Daniele Archibugi and David Held, eds., 1995, *Cosmopolitan Democracy*, Cambridge, Polity; Archibugi, Daniele, David Held, and Martin Kohler, eds., *Re-Imagining Political Community*, Cambridge, Polity, 1999; Cheah, Pheng and Bruce Robbins, eds., 1998, *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press; Vertovec, Steven and Robin Cohen, eds., 2003, *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.
27. See Calhoun, "Belonging in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary" and the exchange with Brubaker that follows it.
28. Martha Nussbaum, 1996, *For Love of Country*, Boston, Beacon, p. 5.
29. Scale is of course significant as a continuous variable; to say something like "at the scale of the nation-state" accordingly masks enormous diversity in the actual scale–territory, population, wealth, state capacity–of nation-states (never mind the contentious question of how states are related to nations). Part of what is meant in such statements is not, I think, precisely scale but corporate organization. And of course states are not the only such corporations. It is also possible that what is meant by 'scale' is sovereignty, though this is

not precisely a scalar concept, though it is arguably much more quantitatively variable than the usual accounts of its categorical perfection suggest (indeed, Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, suggests it is virtually a myth, if a powerful one). Another categorical distinction is really a matter of scale: the limits of the organization of social life through face-to-face arrangements. These limits occasion the rise of forms of written, printed or electronic communication, new forms of relationships among strangers, and non-linguistic steering media.

30. Will Kymlicka, 2001, *Politics in the Vernacular*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 38.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 162.