Globalization, Hegemony and Sovereignty

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HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal has proposed as a principle of governance "anthropolicy." The word speaks to the need to develop a humanitarian politics worthy of the name, where the welfare of the people matters, and not the private interests of a few. Prince Hassan describes eight major themes: human solidarity; dialogue; security; economy, energy and environment; multilateralism; democracy and civil society; culture and education; and universal consciousness.[1] *In the spirit of his humanitarian approach, and with great respect for his intellectual and moral leadership, I should like to address aspects of these themes from the perspective of an American university professor, during what in my country are very sad political times.*

1. Democracy

United States foreign policy instructs by negative example. It demonstrates the tragic consequences of militaristic unilateralism, refusal to engage in dialogue, and narrow, partisan consciousness. That the Bush administration's aggression in the Middle East was disastrously conceived was evident from the start. Deeply troubling for those who spoke out at the time was the degree to which the country's informed opposition was incapable of holding the arrogance of US power in check. Despite thousands of hours of so-called news on hundreds of TV channels and radio stations, the American public and its leaders remained shockingly ignorant of the culture, history, and social life of those people whom it sent its armies to attack, and simultaneously claimed to liberate. George W. Bush made national elections a fetish in his public relations campaign for democracy Iraq. But the policy actions of the United States—the destruction of civilian life in Iraq, the legal black hole of Guantanamo Bay, the horrors of torture of Abu Ghraib—were anything but democratic, giving the world a moral lesson in how *not* to behave.

Within the United States, national elections have finally registered the public's rejection of Bush's policies, and still these policies continue. We have learned that principles other than the right to vote are indispensable for a modern, civilized political order. One such principle is the separation of powers—multilateralism on the level

of domestic politics—that belongs to a republican philosophical tradition embodied in the US Constitution. The Bush regime violates this principle when it claims virtually unchecked power to operate in the field of foreign policy. The whole point of providing constitutionally for a civilian commander-in-chief, an elected representative of the people, was to guarantee that the military could not be used against the people, or in opposition to the people's will. In foreign deployments, the Bush regime has behaved as if the terrifying military might of the US were its own private army. Until recently the US Congress has been ineffective in executing constitutional checks on Presidential power. But the federal courts frequently were, and it mattered (so much so that it appears an executive purging of judges hostile to the administration was deemed necessary).

A second, indispensable political principle for a functioning democracy is ensuring a strong civil society. This principle has been weakened generally by the neo-liberal order, exemplified in Margaret Thatcher's notorious statement that there *is* no society, only the individual and the state. Still, many Americans refuse to accept this argument. They continue to *believe* they live in a country where the people rule, and it is through organizations of civil society that they have managed to exercise this belief, even when government institutions have failed them. The university is the institution of civil society that guarantees my freedom to dissent. The

government has applied pressure to private university administrations to conform, individual faculty members and students have been harassed, and illustrious foreign scholars have been refused entry visas. Still, these actions have stopped short of generalized intervention and control. Effective censorship has occurred in a less direct manner nonetheless, as academic irrelevance achieves the same result. The great university traditions of scholarship in the humanities have been sidelined by a shift in the location of knowledge-production to partisan "think tanks" (private, policy-advising institutions), and a shift in funding within universities toward areas of research that promise profits for private companies. Indeed, with the monopolization of media by a very few giant companies, the public sphere is itself being privatized. These trends place into jeopardy a third prerequisite of democracy beyond the mere formality of elections, the capacity to cast an *informed* vote. It requires media institutions committed to education rather than entertainment, public debate rather than the marketing of opinion.

But perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from observing the United States today is that no democracy is possible domestically in a country that does not exercise these principles in world affairs. The Bush administration's premise, that one can spread freedom by means of invading armies, is a contradiction in terms. Although disavowed in the West since the time of the Napoleonic Wars, this fact finally appears obvious. Today

global politics is undergoing a monumental shift away from unilateralism in terms of power and legitimacy. Nothing would be more salutary for the United States as a democratic nation than to give up its claims to global dominance, and never has it appeared more plausible that the world is ready for a new order. Ours is clearly an era of transition. But who will determine the new order, and with it, the meaning of global change? As 500 years of Western hegemony draw to a close, there are those prepared to argue that it is time for a different civilization to become dominant, a new chapter in the familiar story of good that triumphs over evil, but now the designations of good and evil change places. It would be a mistake, however, to make the United States the scapegoat, as the problems we face are not limited to one nation or culture, much less to one political faction or ruling clique. The present failures of US policy are symptomatic of issues that truly are global. They confront humanity generally, and they are not amenable to partial solutions.

2. Universal Consciousness: the Meaning of History

To claim that an era "belongs" to a particular civilization has proven an almost irresistible metaphor. The outcome of imperial struggles is said to determine time's meaning. Sovereign power defines history in a way that makes its own dominance appear to embody universal history, employing "chrono-crats" to guard the produc-

tion and dissemination of this view. But every era has its chrono-rebels as well, who create alternative, anti-imperial visions of time. Modernity stole the thunder of the chrono-rebels by making an eternal value out of change itself. To be modern is to change, and that means to be in possession of a past. Sovereign power interprets this past under the sign of progress that, in turn, gives universal meaning to the future. The debate within modernity has been as much about tempo as substance. Francis Fukayama notoriously proclaimed the end of history, implying the present world order was history's final goal. Jürgen Habermas insisted that modernity was, on the contrary an unfinished project. Ahmet Davutoglu then asked, if modernity is unfinished, who will complete it? He gave an answer: a renewed civilization of Islam. But in this struggle over ownership of time's meaning we miss the possibility of a more radical solution, that the title deed to time not be allowed *any* exclusive or exclusionary appropriation.

The meaning of history is also a theological question. Better put, it is the place where theology and politics intersect. Only God can be said to be sovereign over the history of His creation. But what earthly, political sovereign can claim the right to act in His name? There has been much criticism in the West of *jihad*, interpreted as legitimating war. The West forgets that the religious justification of violence, the claim that one's political enemies are the enemies of the one, true God, was an

invention, rather, of the Holy Roman Empire. In the 4th century C.E., the churchman and historian Eusebius outlined this doctrine in his hagiographic text, *In Praise of Constantine*. Islam borrowed from both the Persian and Roman/Byzantine traditions in developing its own theory of imperial sovereignty. Monarchy means literally "one source," and across a broad sweep of Europe, Africa and Asia, kings have ruled as a reflection of the divine.[2]

The problem of politics today is not religion. It is the refusal to acknowledge that the inevitable intersection of politics and religion, earthly and divine sovereignty, is also inevitable conflict. Reconciliation between them can only be temporary if it is not to destroy the truth of both. Earthly sovereigns who claim divine power give themselves, mere mortals, a license for tyranny, but if ethical belief shuns political engagement, it allows tyrants to operate unchecked. No political position is ever fully secular. Nor should it be. Ethical politics appeals necessarily to principles that transcend present realities. If, as some secularists would wish, transcendence is routed out of the political arena, sovereign power has no obligation to be moral. At the same time, moral resistance that resorts to violence harms human bodies just as brutally.

Historically, both Christian and Islamic imperial politics have faced the conundrum of how to negotiate the paradoxical relationship between earthly power and

divine authority. The issue haunts the present political situation as well, as both George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden claim obedience to God, while ordering the death of human beings. Pierre Bourdieu, in a book-long attack against Heidegger's ontology, introduces a mundane concept: "skewed" (in French, *louche*) that is helpful here.[3] The dictionary defines the word:

> *Skewed*. This term is used, in grammar, to indicate utterances which seem at first to introduce one meaning but which go on to articulate an entirely different one. It is used in particular of phrases whose logical construction is ambivalent to the point of disturbing their clarity of expression. What renders a phrase skewed arises (…) when [the specific distribution of words] seem at first glance to create a certain relation, although in fact they entertain a different one: just as skewed-eyed people seem to look in one direction, while they are actually looking somewhere else.

Heidegger's discourse, claims Bourdieu, is skewed. The philosopher appears to talk of metaphysics when he is really making political claims, giving implicit support for the leader cult of fascism. I am arguing that what allows Heidegger's ambiguity of language to work in this way is that just such a skewed relationship *really does* exist between politics and metaphysics. Carl Schmitt's term "political theology" is another example: the words, rightly, are linked together, but Schmitt, wrongly, allows them to dissolve into each other, so that his argument is skewed, precisely because his distribution of words is not. Their appearance to line up can only be accomplished by what Bourdieu calls an "ideological illusion."[4]

Politics and theology are and indeed must be connected, but in a way that, rather than closing the circle, allows their necessarily skewed relationship to remain apparent. It is an awkward position, and not only grammatically. It demands that we keep skewing our gaze to catch the true nature of the relationship. When we are looking at divine sovereignty, we have to keep one eye on earthly politics and, vice versa, when we are examining earthly politics, we must keep one eye on the divine. The separation of Church and State does not entail their isolation. The mediating figure that connects them is *humanity*.

3. Human Solidarity

Multiculturalism is supported generally today as a corrective to imperialist attempts to impose universal values on the diverse cultures of the world. But it does not in itself create human solidarity. What does connect us, the global economy, produces energy and environmental crises that are conducive to political conflicts rather than a common sense of purpose. The neo-liberal ideology adopted by large expanses of the world is inadequate to meet these challenges. It has left us, no matter what our cultural differences, dangerously vulnerable to a particular form of political populism that thrives on making us enemies of each other.

Our era may be post-national, but it is not yet post-class. On the contrary, while the dynamics of capitalism

appear on the historical surface as perpetual motion, its deeper socio-economic structures continue to be reproduced. Globalization has reconfigured the ethnic specificities of class divisions without eliminating their existence, as references globally to the growing gap between rich and poor make clear. Within culturally homogeneous societies where those with great wealth see it as their social and moral duty to care for those less fortunate and to provide social services for the poor, class differences are softened considerably. But given the extensive movement of people globally today, any solution that presumes homogeneity is insufficient. Social responsibility limited toward one's own ethnic or religious group becomes discriminatory within the larger polity. The presence of Muslim populations within European countries is an economic fact, a consequence of labor migrations. The civilizational question of Turkey's candidacy for membership in the EU makes little sense if the restructuring effects of capitalism are left out of the picture. European concerns regarding *Überfremdung* (literally, "over-foreignization") are a striking resurrection of Malthusian concerns with "over-population," that drew policy consequences lethal to the working class. It is not a question of adding an economic analysis to the political, or reducing the political to the economic, but of seeing economics and politics as fully imbricated in each other, in ways that alter our evaluation of both.

Critical analysis of common problems is the first step toward human solidarity. But it is powerless without the moral will for change. In a more confident era than our own, believers in modernity counted on history's dialectic to provide a way out of present dilemmas—the struggle itself would realize a historical convergence between what is and what ought to be, either through the cunning of reason (Hegel's claim) or the proletarian class (Marx's materialist version). But today these visions are so clouded as to appear implausible—less plausible, indeed, than predictions of planetary destruction, whether immanently by our own actions (the nuclear, ecological and pandemic threats), or transcendently, as millions of religious millenarians now believe. Where, in the elusive idea of humanity, will we find all three of the necessary ingredients for global solidarity and peace: a commonality that binds us, a respect for the differences that allows us our separateness, and perhaps most difficult of all, an autonomous spirit that crosses all boundaries to sustain the moral power of critique?

In a recent book devoted to dialogue with progressive Islamists "on the Left," I was made well aware of complications that arise in trying to map traditional Left/Right political categories onto a hypostatized global public sphere.[5] Political signifiers, themselves mobile, slide in the global spectrum, so that mapping cannot take place on a singular and coherent plane. Meanings can undergo freefall within the context of multiple global publics, as

demonstrated in the recent affair of the Danish cartoons. Are we to conclude that cultural relativism makes political solidarity impossible? Is it futile to propose a global agenda for change? Here, again, the inclusion of economic facts can be helpful, because if violently opposed ideological positions are seen to be mediated by similar existential realities, they can lead us to conclusions that alter the political ground upon which Left and Right are positioned. When an unemployed European worker morphs his football-fan identity into ultra-nationalist politics, when a Dubai woman, pushed to the urban margins by shopping-mall construction, endorses traditional polygamy as the antidote to single women's desperate and empty consumerism, when an American male, politically impotent within a borderless world of production and exchange, adopts vigilante actions against "illegals" at the US-Mexican border, they share something more than the xenophobia that divides them.[6] All, in response to the insecurities of global change, imagine a past utopia that never did exist.

Adding to perceptions of collective identity the complicating factor of globally shared economic fates has little appeal to national politicians. At this historical moment, when national communalism is insisted upon in political rhetoric the more, empirically, it is in doubt, the discourse of politics is in need of reinvention. That task will be an uncomfortable one, pushing us over the edge of traditional meanings of Left and Right, and familiar

conceptual frameworks of separate civilizations, or nations, or religious belongings. But if political thinking is to become adequate to the new conditions of a global public sphere, we do not have a choice. So let us focus, not on reassuring observations of our common humanity, but on the most uncomfortable issues that cast that commonality in doubt.

While both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia exist in European nations today, the latter is considered more dangerous to what is called "Europe's future."[7] We need to unpack the meaning of this term. Does such a thing as Europe exist that is threatened by the future, or is the future threat to the concept, Europe, itself? Does Europe have any existence other than as a signifier? Is it an idea, or a place? Does it mean shared cultural values like democracy, tolerance, and liberty, or shared cultural identity embodied in only certain kinds of Europeans? Precisely what, or who is that Europe, the future of which is under threat? And let us consider, front and center, the demographics of the problem that loom large in debates over Turkey's possible EU membership, the fact that it would add millions of Muslims to the population of "Europe." We are not dealing here with the familiar problem of multiculturalism—that is, how to ensure that cultural minorities have equal rights in a national polity. We are dealing with the totally different situation of a group that has traditionally claimed the majority embracing, as co-citizens, a country where that is not the case, and feeling

the threat of becoming the minority within a democratic polity that guarantees rights to minorities, but lives by majority rule. And while the minority of Jews who survived the genocidal era of the mid-twentieth century has been granted the status of honorary members of Europe, the majority category of "Europeans"—however uncomfortable they themselves may be with this fact—inherits a legacy that has defined itself historically as racially white, religiously Christian, and politically imperialist.

Again, this new situation is not structurally unique to Europe. It is felt as well when English-speaking Americans find themselves threatened with becoming minorities in Hispanic-populated states; when natives of Dubai (Arab speaking, Muslim practicing) find themselves reduced to 10% of the country's population; and when Jews in Israel find themselves threatened with the so-called demographics of Palestinian populations. Jordan has had much success in integrating hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, but it now faces the new challenge of political refugees from Iraq.

"Demographic threat" is a euphemism for biological and/or cultural racism that plays into the winning political strategy of us v. them—and the irony is that this politics is equally prevalent among us *and* them. In response to the perceived demographic threat, Islamists in Dubai advocate rigid interpretations of the law, Israeli politicians build walls, Europeans vote to defend their civilizational fortress, and the US Congress gives bipartisan support to

the fantasy project of building a 700-mile barrier along the Mexican border. True, anti-Semitism is no longer effective as a political discourse in Europe; true, Barak Obama, can run for US President as a Black contender; but such signposts of cultural progress are not sufficient cause for celebration.

As signifiers mutate within the disorderly space of the global public sphere, their rescue is imaginable only if they are allowed to mean what they say. There is, for example, only one reasonable approach to the issue of civilization. If the word is to have any signifying value within global conditions of multiple cultural diasporas, then it will have to live up to its universal claim. As Candido Mendes reminded us last year in Baku, there is only one "civilization," the human one, and there is much *un*civilized human behavior within it.[8] No collective can claim to *be* civilized as an ontological fact. Yet we hear from every side that saving one's own civilization justifies any and all uncivilized means used against one's enemies. Common sense tells you this is a self-defeating strategy. American foot-soldiers in Iraq have shown themselves the intellectual superiors of their leaders in making the simple observation that if fully armed, foreign-speaking soldiers busted into *their* homes, they would find it impossible to understand these invaders as liberators, as if American intervention were by definition a civilizational guarantee.

But if civilizational difference is no longer acceptable as an excuse for uncivilized behavior, then erstwhile majorities have a right to be apprehensive about relin-

quishing their positions of dominance, precisely because in recent history the majorities to which they belong have repeatedly used their numerical superiority to act in extremely inhumane ways to minorities under their control—and no sane person would want to leave him or herself vulnerable to the same forms of degradation. There you have it, in a planetary nutshell. If retribution rules the day, if punishments are meted out an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and if guilt-by-association is given the same legitimacy that privilege-by-association has had in endowing the present members of the club with the rewards of past conquests, then whether that club calls itself European, or American, or Israeli, or Sunni, or Shi'ia, the future looks very bleak and very threatening indeed.

Within a political spectrum that opens out to the global public sphere, identity politics is a shifting signifier. On the one hand (on the Left), it is a necessary and successful way to mobilize collective action to achieve equal inclusion within the greater polity. But as a strategy of the greater polity, it takes a sharp turn to the Right, becoming a threat to outsiders of political genocide. When George W. Bush argues from a national-populist perspective that we have to defeat "them over there," so that they do not get "us here at home," the blatant injustice of that statement must strike any impartial listener as appalling. In arguing unapologetically that the destruction of Iraq—or Lebanon, or Afghanistan—is justified so that "we" do not suffer, American policy is not merely guilty of refusing to accept responsibility for past inhumane

acts perpetrated by Western civilization; it is knowingly committing new ones. As for the new accusers, the moment becomes ripe for them to manipulate their own publics to support further atrocities in retaliation, and so our *un*civilized human civilization continues.

But historical repetition is not a fact of nature. The kaleidoscope of political power presents each generation with a new constellation of humanly initiated injustices, but also a new opportunity to liberate humanity from them. Progress does occur. The very conception in political discourse of crimes against humanity is new in history, as are ecological imaginings, global human rights, world health, independent global media, and women's activisms in multiple cultural forms. If globalization is capable of advancing human consciousness, it will be by recognizing that it is no longer a moral option to seek safety under conceptual umbrellas that claim to protect us as members of a specific religion, ethnicity, citizenship, or class—while the global majority of "them" is left outside. Why, then, when the most evident demographic facts and the most obvious common sense argue against it, does the empty rhetoric of exclusionary politics persist? Can we name this political phenomenon and, in naming it, defuse its power?

4. Identitarian Democracy and Global Dissent

I am not sure just how and when, but sometime during George W. Bush's first administration, "politicized"

became a pejorative term, so that to claim that an issue is politicized is now enough to position it outside of legitimate debate—a strange exclusion, that has more to say about the degeneracy of the political debate than the legitimacy of political issues. It is taken for granted that positions are adopted as a pawn for gaining power rather than as a commitment to change reality. Politicized implies the opposite of scientific. The possibility that precisely an objective analysis will lead to the strongest political convictions and hence the most radical campaign for change is ruled out as a contradiction in terms. Challenges to the ruling consensus are called factional and divisive, dangerously upsetting to a fantasized harmony of the polity. The overarching rationale for mandating consensus is that anything less will aid the enemy and is therefore unpatriotic, even treasonous. How do we account for this perversion, whereby dissent, the very soul of democracy, is refigured as its ruin? Can we achieve a conceptual understanding that holds cultural particulars in abeyance, so that meaning is maintained despite the sliding significations of the global context?

Relevant to these questions is the scholarly approach of Aziz Al-Azmeh, whose work takes us out of the model of "us v. them" in a way that is disquietingly sane and worthy of emulation.[9] Al-Azmeh contributed to a recently republished anthology that takes up the condescending charge, frequently heard in the West, that Arab states and Muslim cultures are incapable of de-

mocracy. Whereas many of his co-authors adopteed the more familiar defense of explaining, excusing, and even justifying democratic failures by analyzing the peculiar characteristics of the contemporary Muslim world (oil rents, demographics, residues of tradition, the colonial legacy), Al-Azmeh provides the strongest critique of Islamist politics precisely by not arguing for Arab or Muslim exceptionalism. Rather, he identifies as a "constant trope" of "Romantic, right-wing populism world-wide" the appropriation of "democracy" by political factions in identitarian terms: "It is almost invariably, and always implicitly, assumed that the state and the group that wields immediate power within it are identical."[10] This "thoughtless, rhetorical conflation" is characteristic of the newly resurgent populism. It defines "the Arabs" or "the Europeans" as a "self-identical utopia," that experiences change only as rise and fall; external forces have only "superficial impact" on their essential features, without "substantial and durable effect."[11] Islamist discourse distorts democracy to mean the political embodiment of the "people" in this sense: "the accent on unicity and identity is thus primary and constitutive"[12]—which is, of course, precisely what we see in the populist rhetoric of George W. Bush. Whereas political contestation is essential to democracy (always imperfect, always changing, never complete), in this discourse "the general will and popular choice are (…) placed on a plane of identity and mentioned in the same breath as divine will (…)."[13]

The advantage of Al-Azmeh's description is that it allows us to conceptualize the contemporary political field in a unified way. It encourages us to formulate the political danger—let us call it "identitarian democracy"—as holding across enmity lines that divide us, uniting that which our own politicians insist is incompatible: us and them. But if, on all sides, the right-wing populism of identitarian democracy is on the ascendance, then where does that leave a global Left? We are led to conclude that neutrality in terms of binary oppositions, precisely the refusal to participate in the mirrored fantasies of our incompatible differences, is the most radically Left position of all.

Can we escape the political binaries of friend and enemy, and will we find ourselves among the real global majority if we do? Moreover, can we take our words with us, so that they are allowed to mean what they say? Freedom of speech is not about "anything goes"; it is freedom to describe reality without censorship, and to disagree openly about its meaning without being accused of "politicizing'" the issues. Descriptive accuracy demands that we recognize those aspects of Israeli policy toward Palestinians that have had the effect of apartheid, a term disallowed by the logic of identitarian democracy—but this policy does not make a virtue out of the brutal tactic of recruiting "martyrs" to bomb Israeli civilian targets. It is true that over the centuries Jews have suffered less religious persecution and were

more socially integrated within the Islamic world than they were in Christendom[14]—but saying so is not the same as endorsing Ahmadinejad's present-day, identitarian distortions. Ahmadinejad made a terrible blunder by giving a public forum to non-scholarly doubters of the Holocaust, and it is not Islamophobic to say so. The Holocaust happened. At the same time, it is not the only genocide we are obliged to remember. And if today Islamophobia is more threatening to European Muslims than anti-Semitism is to European Jews, that does not mean that assimilation into Europe's *existing* civilization is a progressive or desirable political goal.

The Left needs to maintain radical neutrality in the global public sphere, because its politics are no less vulnerable to the totalitarian dangers of identitarian democracy than politics on the Right. There may appear to be a short-term gain for the identitarians, and those who are seduced into identifying with them, but the price to pay is too high. It leads, like obsessive compulsion, to repeating the crimes of the past in a fetishistic attempt to ban their memory. The long-term effect of this politics is suicidal, as the verbal weapons crafted to construct the enemy turn their lethal power against dissenters within the collective itself.

I am suggesting that the future threat to Europe, or Israel, or the United States is not from outside. Rather, it is the home-grown, identitarian populism that appeals to these as given and self-explanatory categories, embody-

ing a quasi-natural essence that needs to be defended without being defined, because if definitions were allowed, they would expose the racial and religious meanings sedimented in such terms that are implicated in a history of crimes against humanity. But the answer cannot be to give free reign to the "enemy" to punish the sins of the past or the present. Muslim societies are as much at risk from the dangers of identitarian democracy. Nor is Latin America immune, or any place on the globe where politicians mobilize an essentialist construction of the collective in order to silence dissent at home, relying on a discourse of cultural authenticity that instrumentalizes democracy, so that a particular party or individual or sect claims to speak as the embodiment of an exclusionary whole, the sole legitimate representative of its essential nature. The distinctions that emerge from such a perception of the present might allow us to redeploy the categories of Left and Right on a global political spectrum, presenting us with a different set of challenges. We—I mean, now, a global, "we" that is in the making—would need to transform the meaning of democracy, stretching it in ways not limited to the original, culturally European definition. We need to develop critical categories of analysis that do not presume the fantasy of separate civilizations. The irony is that, surely, most of us in the world do not desire a scenario of political violence that demands we identify with us *or* them. We desire, that is, precisely what our identitarian politicians tell us we

cannot choose. Crafting the conditions of that choice, in opposition to all partial identity appeals, is what a global Left must work to make possible today.

Notes

1. http://www.elhassan.org/lcd/personal/evision3.html.
2. Aziz Al-Azmeh, *Musilm Kingship: Power and the Sacred in Muslim, Christian and Pagan Polities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001).
3. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991),
4. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1988.)
5. Susan Buck-Morss, *Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2006).
6. On the Dubai example, see the new work by Ahmed Kanna (University of Iowa), "Walter Benjamin: *Arcades* Project and Praxis: Architecture, Totalization, and the New Global City" (in print.).
7. Matti Bunzl, *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe* (Chicago: Prickley Paradigm Press, in print).
8. See the proceedings of the *13th international Conference of the Académie de la Latinité,* Baku, April 19-26, 2006 (Rio de Janeiro: Educam, 2006).
9. Al-Azmeh (born in Damascus) has developed insights into contemporary politics grounded in years of scholarship in comparative medieval politics from Latin Christendom to the Muslim world.
10. Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Populism Contra Democracy: Recent Democratist Discourse in the Arab World," *Democracy Without Democrats?* ed. Ghassan Salamé (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 122; also *idem*, *Islams and Modernities* (London: Verso, 1993). Similar arguments have been made by Roxanne Euben in *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1999), and Ali Mirsepassi, *Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

11. Al-Azmeh, "Populism Contra Democracy," p. 121.
12. Al-Azmeh, "Populism Contra Democracy," p. 126.
13. Al-Azmeh, "Populism Contra Democracy," p. 124.
14. See the comparative history by Mark R. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).