Of Žižek, Huntington, and Beyond: Eurocentrism and Americanism against the Barbarian Threats

Nelson Maldonado-Torres

The end of the Cold War signaled not only a dramatic change in global politics, but in the academy as well. Two of the academic disciplines or perspectives which were deeply affected by the change were Marxism and Area Studies. The collapse of the Soviet Union confirmed for many the suspicions of leftist pessimism: that capitalism would at some point rule uncontested and that no other alternative was possible. After almost fifty years of international relations that were to a great extent defined by Cold War politics and ideologies, the world adopted a different configuration. Now nations did not appear to be defined primarily by competing ideologies. The mapping of the world in terms of capitalist nations and communist projects lost its coordinates. With such drastic changes in world affairs what we have seen after 1989 in respect to Marxism and Area Studies is, as it were, two epistemic frameworks desperately looking for an object of study and for a viable approach to new realities.

Marxism and Area Studies have spawned and influenced many academic innovative and fruitful academic approaches. Some of these, like postcolonial studies or world-system

analysis, represent efforts to question the modernist and colonial presuppositions of Area Studies and Marxism. But there are many who adhere more strictly to the codes of the epistemic frameworks in question. Most interesting today is the commonalities between some of those who attempt to revive Area Studies and Marxism. This essay explores the re-enactment of modern/colonial and Eurocentric mentalities in the reshaping of Marxism and Area Studies. I wish to analyze the intriguing connection and (from a certain point of view) unsuspected alliance between certain strain of Marxism and patriotic Americanism in post-Cold War times. My analysis will focus on the recent work of the Lacanian-Marxist Slavoj Žižek and that of the Area Studies scholar Samuel Huntington. Both, Žižek and Huntington attempt to re-construct the basic coordinates of their epistemic frameworks by identifying and opposing a series of enemies or "challenges": deconstruction, multiculturalism, and ethnic identity politics. They wish to make a transition from liberal multiculturalism and identity politics to leftist Eurocentrism and populist Americanism. Even though Marxism and Area Studies for a long time served opposite camps of an ideological battle (Marxism mainly identified with perspectives which legitimized the claims of communist regimes, and Area Studies mainly oriented by the needs of U.S. defense, developmentalism and modernization theory) they attempt to define themselves today in opposition to common enemies, which leads them to adopt similar perspectives and to assert that which they share in common. They confront the same enemies and use those enemies to justify a culturalist Eurocentered and Christiancentered view of the world that

reintroduces many of the colonial and racist premises fought against by the forms of analysis and disciplines that they disavow or ignore. Regressive postures pose themselves today as beacons of innovation and critique. This is not unique to the academic realm, but it is still necessary to examine it in its own terms and attempt to articulate alternatives to them.

I will first reflect briefly on the links between Marxism and Area Studies. This will provide the basis for a discussion of the "regressive" turn in Žižek and Huntington's recent works. I argue that while both Žižek and Huntington disavow ethnic identity politics, they have an identity politics of their own which becomes most obvious in their respective defense of Eurocentrism and Americanism. Following Immanuel Wallerstein analysis of Ethnic Studies as an unintended consequence of Area Studies scholarship, I consider the extent to which the new expressions of Eurocentrism and Americanism are unintended consequence of Ethnic Studies scholarship. This possibility poses the challenge to rethink Ethnic Studies as a decolonial and transmodern enterprise, in which decolonizing views and projects such as women's studies, post-colonial studies, world-system analysis, and the philosophy of liberation come together and challenge each other in productive ways. As I have proposed elsewhere, I believe that the *damné* rather than the people, the proletariat, or the multitude, become the primordial object of investigation for these decolonial and transmodern sciences.[1] In the final section of this essay I include a brief reflection on the meaning of damnation and its significance for intellectual activity today.

Marxism and Area Studies

Marxism was born, both as an ideology and as epistemic framework in the second half of the nineteenth century. Marxism was distinguished from conservatism and liberalism in that it posited the need for a radical restructuring of society through revolutionary change.[2] Marxism inspired the October Revolution in 1917 and stood as the backbone of the socialist project in the Soviet Union from its beginning to its drastic end in 1989. While Marxism became the ideology and the epistemic framework that inspired resistance to capitalism and opposition to the Western block formed after the Second World War, Area Studies came to represent somewhat the opposite: it was the means by which the now hegemonic United States would collect information about different regions of the world in order to guarantee its security as well as to promote democracy and capitalist enterprise. While Marxism assumed that radical revolutionary change toward a communist form of social organization was possible, necessary and desirable; Area Studies approached different regions of the world through the lenses of development and modernization, thus positing the idea that capitalism could flourish globally and that the United States represented the epigone of democracy (the model toward which other societies could aspire).

Both Marxism and Area Studies were deeply challenged in the 1960's. Marxism was contested on the grounds of an apparent economicism, its reconciliation with totalitarianism, and its teleological character. Marxism was also questioned for its participation in a modern concept of rea-

son that disavows the relevance of race and gender perspectives in the production of knowledge. Area Studies, on its part, entered into a deep ethical crisis in the 1960's in large part due to the scandalous revelation of its uses to address problems of insurgency in different countries, something which made obvious the link between the field and the imperial ambitions of the United States.[3] Marxism and Area Studies were in some ways the *prima donnas* of the Cold War: two forms of scholarship for the most part pictured the world in the image needed for the assertion of power by two hegemons, the Soviet Union and the United States. Marxism and Area Studies were not certainly unique to these two countries, or were completely separate from each other, but their epistemic premises reflected two different ideological options which were to some extent ingrained and represented by dominant ideologies in the so-called First and Second Worlds.

The differences between Marxism and Area Studies—the first giving primacy to the revolution of the proletariat, the other to the capitalist modernization of the world—should not lead one to think that the two are completely opposed. I am not only referring to that Marxism has clearly shown interest in global affairs since its inception, and that Area Studies, particularly after its crisis in the 1960's, received an influx of Marxist perspectives. The possibility of such contact points to a deeper commonality, which makes itself evident in their responses to their respective crises. It is no accidental that Marxism and Area Studies suffered a crisis at the same time. What was put in question in the 1960's was

something that they both share. I am referring here to a modern/colonial horizon of thought.[4] Modernity/coloniality refers to the linkages between the project of modernity and the logic of coloniality.[5] Modernity/coloniality makes reference to the way in which time, space, and knowledge have been conceptualized and understood in modernity through an unquestioned assertion of what Anibal Quijano refers to as the coloniality of power, which includes Eurocentrism as one of its outcomes.[6] Eurocentrism refers to an epistemic perspective that interprets the world through a very limited lenses which focus on a very selective and ideologically charged view of European history and experiences. Eurocentrism posits Europe as the site where the relevant questions about humanity's past, presence, are raised and best elucidated. Eurocentrism shuts down the possibility of questioning, and thus, of theorizing, to non-European subjects. Even though, as Immanuel Wallerstein has sharply pointed out, the three ideologies of modernity (conservatism, liberalism, and Marxism) give expression to different conceptions of the speed and the extent of change in modern societies,[7] when it comes down to the questioning of Eurocentrism, the three ideologies are fundamentally conservative. This is precisely what has become very obvious after the end of the Cold War when Marxists like Slavoj Žižek, for instance, attempt to rescue Marxism through an appeal to orthodoxy. I will explore in this essay the connections of apparent contraries in post-Cold War times. More specifically, I will elaborate on the linkages and connections between Marxism and Area Studies, as they appear in recent elaborations by the Marxist

Slavoj Žižek and the Area Studies scholar Samuel Huntington. I aim to make evident the reliance of the two projects on a similar conservative agenda that relies on a problematic geo-political conception of knowledge.

The Regressive Marxism of Slavoj Žižek[8]

Re-rooting communist hope in Western Christianity became very important for the European left after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Without being able to find a home in the Soviet Union or the traditional communist party, there were not too many choices opened to maintain alive the communist project. There was thus the need for a reconciliation of the European Marxist left with Europe and with Western Christianity. By the time in which such need became urgent, the very idea of Europe had been strongly contested by scholars who, following Fanon's insight about the roots of Europe, turned to criticize heavily the project of European civilization. Like anyone desperately in the search for roots, the left has tended to turn increasingly reactionary, to the point of embracing orthodoxy as an emblem of criticism.[9] Such is the main topic of Slavoj Žižek's most recent work, *The Puppet and the Dwarf.*

The Puppet and the Dwarf is the latest installment of Slavoj Žižek's intriguing saga of ideology critique and materialist reading of Christianity. Once more the same protagonists return: Paganism, Judaism, and Christianity; Christ, Paul, and Lenin; Hegel and Lacan. The plot also preserves its center and focus. Like in *The Fragile Absolute* and *Belief* we find a hard-core materialist fighting the "massive onsla-

ught of obscurantism" in contemporary philosophy and popular culture. The arch-enemies also remain the same: New Age and Oriental Spirituality, Lévinasian philosophy of Otherness, Derridean deconstruction, the post-secular turn in continental philosophy, and subaltern identity politics. Žižek aims to create a "short circuit" in the circulation of these ideologies and philosophies by revealing their ultimate rendition, if not outright complicity, with the logic of capital and with an ideal of the human which is decrepit, paralyzing, and ultimately, inhuman.

The Puppet is an extension as well as a confession of sorts. The core of the book is formed by an engagement with G. K. Chesterton's 1908 book *Orthodoxy*. If in *The Fragile Absolute* Žižek outlines the scope of his project in terms of a defense of the ties between Marxism and Christianity, *The Puppet* makes clear that he is willing to go to the very end with this project—up to the point of embracing orthodoxy as a banner for radical critique. Like Žižek today, Chesterton fought in his time against the onslaught of then new spiritualisms. Chesterton responded to the "heresies" of his day with an uncompromising orthodox position according to which the solution for the crises of the age is only found within the coordinates of Christian doctrine. When all is said and done, Chesterton argued, the searcher discovers that he arrives at exactly the same place from which he departs, in his case, to Christianity. Žižek's confession is that his so-called post-deconstructionist approach cannot but take a similar route. It is from here that he will enthusiastically endorse orthodoxy as a project.

Žižek's *Puppet and the Dwarf* represents the highest expression of the anxiety for roots that has characterized the leftist project in Europe and the United States as well.[10] His search for roots is not totally different from that of the German thinker Martin Heidegger. Like in Heidegger, there is in Žižek's project an extreme critique of Western modernity and an equal attempt to save the West at the same time. The difference is that where Heidegger turned to fascism and Germancentrism, Žižek vindicates Marxism, Eurocentrism, and an orthodox version of Western Christianity.[11] This difference, however, only grounds the highest commonality between Heidegger and Žižek: their epistemic racism. For while Heidegger could not think about genuine philosophy out of the German language, Žižek cannot see political radicalism out of the Marxist-Christian diad. As he puts it in *The Puppet and the Dwarf*:

> My claim here is not merely that I am a materialist through and through, and that the subversive kernel of Christianity is accessible also to a materialist approach; my thesis is much stronger: this kernel is accessible *only* to a materialist approach—and vice versa: to become a true dialectical materialist, one should go through the Christian experience.[12]

Žižek's conservatism is radical, and because of that, it challenges the complacency of conservatives and non-conservatives alike. The radicalism, however, does not hide the amount of epistemic racism; just like Heidegger's suggestive analyses of the problem of technology and nihilism did not hide it either. This racism is evinced in the above passage. Since it does not surface in Žižek's work that there could be truly radical political options beyond the horizons of dia-

lectical materialism then it follows that Christianity is the one and only source of true radicalism. This explains, among many other things, his view of Buddhism. Žižek's views about Christianity and the left gives him license to engage in a new form of Orientalism that knows no boundaries. After a few pages dedicated to the analysis of the statements of a few Zen Buddhists and a portion of the *Bhagavad Gita*, Žižek assumes enough authority to observe:

> This means that Buddhist (or Hindu, for that matter) all-encompassing Compassion has to be opposed to Christian intolerance, violent Love. The Buddhist stance is ultimately one of Indifference, of quenching all passions that strive to establish differences; while Christian love is a violent passion to introduce Difference, a gap in the order of being, to privilege and elevate some object at expense of others.[13]

Žižek reifies Buddhism and Christianity and then assigns them intrinsic logics that help to discriminate one from the other just as easily as Heidegger was able to differentiate between philosophical and non-philosophical languages. For Žižek, Oriental spirituality is indifferent to the world and its logic of non-distinction leads its adherent to become complicit with military powers, if not even openly endorse them. Monotheists, are, on the contrary, either tolerant of differences or intolerants of love.[14] The search for roots inhibits the capacity for careful examination of the ways in which that which we call religion never operates in a vacuum. The extremism of Žižek's epistemic racism is manifest in that while he dismisses "Oriental spirituality" because of its affiliations with militarism, he keeps Hegel in his sanctuary even though Hegel remains one of the strongest supporters of war in the Western world.[15]

The Populist Patriotism of Samuel Huntington[16]

Samuel Huntington is famous for his proposal in his 1996 *The Clash of Civilizations* that international relations after the Cold War were no longer based on ideological differences, but on cultural ones. For many scholars, 1989 came to represent the emergence of something new, a leap into a new stage of history that could very well represent its own conclusion (Fukuyama). After decades in which the United States and the Soviet Union terrorized the world with threats of imminent nuclear destruction, imperial control over many territories, interventions and collaborations which helped to implant military anti-democratic regimes in many parts of the world a cadre of scholars acted as if the fall of the Berlin Wall meant the definitive end of an age marked by the concentration of military power in two blocks. Instead of making an assessment of the effects of the Cold War in the psyches, cultures, political regimes, and social configurations of peoples living in countries where there was direct or indirect influence by the two super powers, Area Studies scholars like Huntington shifted the analyses of international relations from ideological tension to cultural ones. This shift implied the denial of long term effects of Cold War political and ideological factors into the global dynamics of power. This move not only fails to address the trauma of the Cold War and its effects in peoples around the world, but also the question of what it meant for them that there suddenly was only one uncontested hegemon standing. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* demonstrates the impossibility of one scholar to articulate questions from different perspectives and the will to main-

tain as legitimate only one referent: that of the uncontested hegemon.

After three decades witnessing the dramatic transformation of Area Studies and the challenge to them by fields such as postcolonial studies and ethnic studies, Huntington attempts to restore Area Studies to its original vocation of intellectual overseer in the interest of power.[17] His latest book, *Who are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* continues his crusade, but this time shifts from international threats to the United States and Western civilization, to the threats that are found in its midst. Just like 1989 motivates *The Clash of Civilizations*, the events of September 11 stand at the background of Huntington's most recent efforts. And just like before, he engages into a very selective kind of scholarship that seeks to effectively erase the questions and concerns that emerge from marginalized and racialized social positions.

Huntington's point of departure is the upsurge of patriotism that occurred after the attacks on the World Trade Center. His main concern is to look for ways in which people would feel motivated to sustain it after they cease to feel threatened by "terrorism." Huntington fears that as people resume their normal lives they will also allow their national identity to decrease in relevance. Huntington's strategy for opposing this trend could not be more straightforward: he identifies other enemies. Multiculturalism, deconstruction, sub-national and transnational identities, immigration, and most particularly the growing Hispanic presence in the United States become in his book the set of others that are to join Osama bin Laden and Al Quaeda in reminding U.S. Ameri-

cans of the need to commit themselves strongly to national values. Mexicans join Arab Muslims in representing a threat to the United States. Their culture and values lead them either to attack the United States or to resist assimilation, and thus, to threaten the linguistic unity of the nation. Huntington reminds the U.S. American public that they should not only be weary of armed terrorism but of cultural terrorism as well. Mexicans in the U.S. and Hispanics at large appear in his text as no less than cultural terrorists.

In an incisive review of Samuel Huntington's *Who are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity*, David Montejano, a historian of the U.S. Southwest, points to what he describes as a "intelligence failure" in Huntington's work (Montejano, 2004). Huntington assumes that Hispanic culture is homogeneous and monolithic. He seems "unaware that transnationalism, bilingualism, biculturalism, and a concentrated Mexican presence have been facts of border life since the region was annexed over 150 years ago."[18] For Montejano, "it is apparent that this Harvard professor has just taken note of the Southwest and its large Mexican presence." Montejano is right. Huntington seems to know much about numbers and statistics, but, ironically, he does not know much or express much interest about the culture of the people that he classifies as a menace. This would be paramount for a book that takes culture as the prime unit of analysis. Instead of investigating the manifold forms of the cultures that he allegedly wishes to investigate, he assumes that one can easily define two distinct and separate Anglo and Hispanic cultures.

As it occurred with the federal intelligence agencies that lost track of the attackers of September 11, it is not too difficult to detect that Huntinton's own "intelligence failure" is not merely due to lack of expertise in an area, or simply to lack of information. The "intelligence failure" in his book seems to be mainly due to a problem in the production of knowledge. Huntington's patriotic populist intellectual positioning fits well with the traditional model of Area Studies scholarship. His patriotic intellectualism is the translation of his persona as an Area Studies scholar into the field of national matters. This shift in some ways completes the mission of an Area Studies scholar: defense from threats to the nation should include the location of both external and internal enemies.

Who are We? attempts to recover a lost territory for Area Studies. As Immanuel Wallerstein has pointed out, the crisis of modernization theory and Area Studies in the 1960's not only led to a questioning of loyalty to United States foreign policy, but also laid the ground for a different kind of area studies: the study of what could be rendered as the "Third World within" the United States. This is primarily ethnic studies, but women's studies as well. Wallerstein refers to Ethnic Studies and Women Studies variants of Area Studies because

> they too tended to group scholars from multiple traditional disciplines (…), they too insisted that their subject matter could neither be studied ahistorically (pre-1945 ethnography and Oriental studies) nor be studied by simple application of nomothetic universalizing social science.[19]

The similarities between Area Studies and Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies did not hide their differences. As Wallerstein notes:

> But these academic enterprises as social movements followed an inverse path from that of 1945-1970 area studies. Area studies, as we have seen, was a top-down enterprise. (…) Women's studies and the multiple variants of "ethnic" studies had bottom-up origins. They represented the (largely post-1968) revolt of those whom the university had "forgotten." Theirs was a claim to be heard, and to be heard not merely as describers of particular groups that were marginal, but as revisers of the central theoretical premises of social science. (227)

Wallerstein claims that by "first of all undermining the plausibility of traditional ethnography and Oriental studies, then by forcing the 'Western' disciplines to take into account a larger range of data, and finally by questioning the sacrosant division of the disciplines" Area Studies laid the groundwork for the emergence of Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies. Clearly Wallerstein does not mean by this that Area Studies is the necessary and sufficient cause of Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies, but only that it facilitated its emergence in the academy. In retrospect one could add that Area Studies may have helped Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies as much as it disabled them, since it provided the mold for their less politicized incorporation into the academy.

Ethnic Studies traditionally focuses on the study and analysis of the histories and identities of ethnic and racialized groups. At its beginnings Area Studies took national identity as well as the glory and superiority of Western cul-

ture for granted and then went to map the world according to those premises. The emergence of Ethnic Studies interrupted the fluidity and acceptability of those assumptions. For the last thirty years traditional Area Studies has been assailed from the inside through postcolonial variants of Area Studies, and from the outside from views of nation that are contested in Ethnic Studies scholarship. Two decades of republican counter-revolutions and the relative success of multicultural initiatives stand in the background of a shift in Area Studies scholarship that occurred after the end of the Cold War and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Huntington's work stands at the forefront of these changes. While *The Clash of Civilizations* seeks to undo the effects of post-colonial studies scholarship, *Who are We?* takes directly on Ethnic Studies.

The relation of *Who are We?* to Ethnic Studies is not altogether obvious precisely because there is no reference to scholarship done in this field. Huntington aims to take over areas and themes in which Ethnic Studies scholarship has been doing advances for the last three decades without reference to it. Montejano's assessment of Huntington's efforts as a "failure of intelligence" points to this radical dismissal of Ethnic Studies scholarship. With all his emphasis on culture Huntington equally dismisses scholarship in the area of cultural studies. Similar to Žižek, instead of tying together reflections on culture with reflections on power, Huntington relies on concepts of religion and culture that were prevalent in evangelical religious studies at the beginning of the twentieth century. Vijay Prashad has commented on the links between Area Studies and the Christian establishment in the United States. As Prashad indicates:

> Area Studies emerges in the early part of this century mostly as part of U.S. evangelism: K.S. Latourette at Yale helped kick-start East Asian studies (his 1929 book is *History of the Christian Missions in China*); H.E. Bolton at Berkeley pioneered Latin American Studies (his 1936 book is *The Rim of Christendom: A Biography of Eusebio Francisco Kino, Pacific Coast Pioneer*); A.C. Coolidge at Harvard worked out the contours of Slavic Studies (his big book of 1908 is entitled *The United States as World Power*). In its infancy, the Church and Washington held sway over Area Studies. Our evangelical imperials of today want to return to this period.[20]

Huntington, like Žižek, revives early twentieth century culturalist perspectives used in Christiancentered and Eurocentric religious studies scholarship in order to oppose what they perceive as the barbarian threats of the day. If there is an example of regressive scholarship today Huntington competes with Žižek in setting the mark.

The appeal to religion and the aura of early twentieth-century religious studies in Huntington's raises other suspicions. As William D. Hart indicates, the emergence of religious studies can be traced back to the effort by White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites to secure a place for the teaching of religious values in academic settings that became more and more secular. These elites wanted to guarantee that their youth had access to an Anglo-Saxon Protestant view of themselves and their world. That is why most departments of religious studies still until today are largely dominated by the study of Christianity. The strategy of the White Anglo Saxon patriotic and protestant elites in forming and endorsing religious studies was that of securing power in circumstances where the centrality of their faith in public affairs was contested. Huntington's redeployment of

Area Studies follows a similar, but much more alarming logic. Witnessing the increase of non-Anglo Saxon Protestants in the country he lists possible responses to it, which include the temptation of genocide. Since he believes that war and conflict are part of the very psychological make up of human beings (26), such behavior appears rather as a natural outcome of conditions of cultural menace and displacement. Huntington's does not endorse this option, but does not interrogate critically the bases for such behavior either. This would have led him to a critical exploration of the very formation of national identity itself. Instead, he leaves the alternatives open, and clearly suggest to immigrants that they better assimilate rather than face such possibilities. If post-1965 immigrants assimilate in the ways that Huntington envisions, clearly enough he would triumph, since the worldview that guarantees the power of White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites would be guaranteed even if they become a minority group in the future. *Who are We?* is a twofold attack on minorities and immigrants from non-European countries. One is more immediate and it concerns policies that seek to reduce their numbers. In this Huntington joins other voices with similar claims in the last decade. The other is more "pre-emptive" as it seeks to guarantee that the current structure of power in the United States and the predominant view of self and others in this country remain untouched even when the current elites are no longer the majority. From here that his work attempts to redefine the terms for reflection on topics that have been dealt with intensely in the last thirty years by disciplines and programs such as ethnic studies.

Huntington's failure to take Ethnic Studies scholarship into account in his exploration of national identity is not accidental. Huntington's dismissal of Ethnic Studies scholarship points to a more dangerous side of his work: the dismissal of the problems and questions that Ethnic Studies scholarship attempts to address. First in a long list, is that Huntington repeats the vicious attempt to depict "America" as a *tabula rasa*. He argues that Anglo-Saxon Protestants who arrived in the seventeenth century, which Huntington regards as the true Native Americans, should be considered as settlers and not immigrants. They created a new society were there was nothing before. They were not accountable to other people or nations, like current immigrants are. There is not one indication in the book of inquire into the ways in which indigenous peoples perceived the arrival of the Anglo-Saxon Protestants or the ways in which they have conceptualized the rights for land and existence in the last three hundred years. If Huntington's own book is an example of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant American culture that he defends, then one must conclude that such culture is highly narcissistic, non-dialogical, and dismissive of claims for justice. But the book, rather than simply the expression of a culture is the outcome of a decision or a project. In this case, it concerns a choice for the primacy of cultural determination over justice and responsibility. Such choices sustain themselves even in the face of contradictions. While on the one hand, Huntington records how the racialization, segregation, and extermination of indigenous peoples extinguished the possibility of a multicultural society in the early stages of "American" history (p. 53), he only complains

about the appearance of multiculturalism three hundred years later (p. 171ff). Would he be consistent, instead of criticizing liberal conceptions of multiculturalism because they are too radical, he would question them because they are not radical enough. Instead, Huntington engages into a patriotic populism that takes popular opinion as the definitive mark of legitimate claims for justice and social change. Would this be the mark of authentic being in the world changes in society like the elimination of segregation would have never taken place.

Huntington's denial of central problems and questions in Ethnic Studies scholarship is partly rooted in that for him the Civil War and the Civil Rights movement did away with national definitions in terms of race and ethnicity. Since then, he believes, the United States is an openly multi-racial and multi-ethnic people. Such an opening, he adds, can be attributed to virtues of the American cultural creed and to Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture. Huntington does not interrogate the extent to which the Creed or the Protestant culture that he celebrates could have had any role in the affirmation of the injustices that women and racialized groups have suffered in the United States. Consider only Christian depictions of blacks, Jews, and Manifest Destiny. Huntington notes that Americans see themselves as chosen people. But he does not explore the extent to which notions of "divine election" have led to genocide and enslavement. Huntington considers liberty and individual rights to be at the center of the American Creed. Yet, he does not raise the question of whether such values could by themselves provide an adequate measure to justice. For him, the American Creed and

the Anglo-Saxon cultural core of U.S. American society provide corrective to all evils and to any excesses. He therefore conceives the Civil Rights movement as a fundamental expression of American values, thus discounting the relevance of intercultural dialogue (think of Gandhi, for example) and denying the importance of the ties to other movements by subalternized and racialized peoples all over the world. Huntington is certainly not interested in exploring the extent to which ideas, concepts, and practices from other cultures and other societies inspired fundamental change in U.S. American society. That is why he limits his discussion of the "Hispanic challenge" to numbers and statistics, and fails to analyze the nature of the bilingual and bicultural creations of border peoples as well as the unique forms of critical theories and views of subjectivity, society, and human conviviality that emerge in such places.

The most curious aspect of Huntington and Žižek's work is that while they disavow ethnic identity politics, they deploy a very strong identity politics of their own: either Eurocentrism or Americanism should be saved at all costs. Huntington's call to defend American national identity, which he depicts as essentially Anglo and Protestant, against immigrant threats and multiculturalism appears paradoxical. Claims to protect a culture are typically deployed with marginal peoples as the referent, not mainstream culture. In some ways Huntington combats Ethnic Studies both by dismissing them but also by enacting some of its most problematic expressions: e.g., affirmation of cultural nationalisms and the complicity with identity politics. Ironically, if Area Studies laid the groundwork for Ethnic Studies, the most

problematic and limiting expressions of Ethnic Studies along with multiculturalism laid the groundwork for a new culturalist deployment of Area Studies in the traditional spirit of defending the nation from foreign threats. Fortunately, Ethnic Studies takes seriously efforts to undo negative elements in the legacies of colonial identities and cultures. From here that the current situation demands a reaffirmation of the strongest and more refined perspectives and methods in Ethnic Studies. I propose that Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies could come together under the umbrella of Decolonial Studies and Transmodern Perspectives.[21] I will spell out some coordinates of decolonial intellectual work with reference to the work of Frantz Fanon and Sylvia Wynter in the next section. Before doing that, I would like to provide an example of what I have in mind by something like Decolonial Studies and Transmodern Perspectives.

Consider, for instance, Gloria Anzaldúa's work. Instead of uncritically affirming culture and the immediate desires for recognition, she explores both self and world in search for the guiding lights or beacons that will allow her to claim her humanity. She articulates not an Anglo or a Hispanic response, but a human response based on her experience in the border of two peoples and cultures. Her border epistemology, which Huntington probably ignores even though it was produced in his own "America," leads her to examine critically Anglo, Hispanic, and indigenous cultures. Accountability, justice, the importance of memory, and a deep sense of ethical responsibility toward other human beings guide her examination and recreation of culture. It is not a matter of rejecting culture for an ideology or abstract Creed. It is

not a matter or narcissistically or romantically glorifying a culture, such as indigenous, "American," or European culture, or of vilifying any of them in a purely reactionary way. It is rather a matter of maturely confronting the cultural sources in which one is immersed. Anzaldúa finds valuable sets of ideas and values in the different cultures in which she is immersed, as well as problems. As she puts it, "hay culturas que matan," there are cultures and elements in cultures that kill.[22] Anzaldúa wishes something very different from a romantic and narcissistic relation with culture; what she wants is to become an actional and responsible self. In her case, a full and complete Lesbian woman of color.

Is there something that Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture could learn from border epistemology? If we follow Huntington, apparently not. At least he does not even raise the question. In his text it is as if Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture could enrich other cultures, but it is in no need of anything and it cannot be penetrated. In this it has the character of a penis. It can penetrate all the cultures that find a place in this country, but there is no need for it to be touched in its core, or at least that is what should by all means be avoided or even recognized. Such resistance suggests a grave case of cultural racism and symbolic homophobia. This is the position of the Master, who can maintain its place as long as it can give to others without ever being changed. Huntington's world is full of such cultures. His view of civilizational conflict betrays a perverted sadistic dream of a violent encounter between impenetrable cultures whose permanent temptation is to fight. In lack of peace, the ultimate victor is that culture which could penetrate the others without being itself pene-

trated. If one followed this psychoanalytical examination to its logical conclusion one would have to say that both *The Clash of Civlizations* and *Who are We?* are haunted by the ghost of a deeply violent, destructive, and perverted but repressed homosexual sadist intellectual posture. Anzaldúa's alternative depiction of ethics, erotics, and culture clearly has today as much relevance as ever.

Who are We? attempts the most amazing feat in revisionist historiography: after three hundred years during which White Anglo Saxon Protestants in the United States have enslaved, colonized, and conquered indigenous peoples, blacks, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos and other "minority" groups, as well as helped maintain a global structure of power that is fundamentally unfair, the text wants to make it appear as if other groups, such as Hispanics, are a menace. Huntington subverts the tables of any decent account of history and accountability. Doesn't this effort exactly obey the racist logic to which these groups have been exposed from the very birth of modernity in the Americas? The temptation for Hispanics is, of course, to attempt to achieve recognition in face of subjects who adhere to this Anglo Saxon Protestant view of the world. The temptation would be to prove to people like Huntington that they have what it takes to be Americans. Instead of legitimating the terms of assimilation, the challenge for Hispanics is to redefine the terms of the debate, to bring accountability to the national scene, to help in rescuing memory of displaced peoples, and to attempt to understand the claims of indigenous peoples and descendents of slaves in this country. The challenge to Hispanics consists in resisting the temptation to

reproduce mainstream standards and cultural values uncritically. Hispanics risk wanting to assimilate to Anglo Saxon Protestant culture at the cost of becoming a real "challenge" to everyone else but to White Anglo Saxon protestants and elites in this country. Would they attempt to join others in the consistent decolonization of space, knowledge, and consciousness in this nation and other parts of the world? Only time will tell.

Decolonization or apartheid?[23] Here resides the veritable "challenge:" a possible challenge as well as a possibility in respect to the decolonization of culture, knowledge, and society in the United States.[24] This challenge requires a response from intellectuals and the diverse sciences. It would be grave to repeat the history of the nineteenth century where it was assumed that nationalization could be achieved or advanced without decolonization. And if the social and human sciences where shaped by both Church and state in the process of their constitution, then it is necessary to enquire now the extent to which such disciplines and scientific perspectives should be reshaped and reoriented. A critical examination of the presuppositions of our sciences and our intellectual perspectives, as well as a revision and replacement of basic concepts and ideas are needed. This is a fundamental task of Ethnic Studies and its avatars: decolonial and transmodern sciences.

Decolonial Studies and Transmodern Perspectives[25]

Elsewhere I have articulated the idea of a weak utopian project as bringing about the Death of European Man.[26] I

think that the peculiar intricacies between "estadounidense" patriotism, Eurocentrism, the propensity to war, and the continued subordination of the theoretical contributions of peoples from the south call for a reformulation of this idea. Today, after the post-1989 and post-September 11 patriotism we shall call more directly simply for the Death of American Man. By American Man I mean a concept or figure, a particular way of being-in-the-world, or else, the very subject of an episteme that gives continuity to an imperial order of things under the rubrics of liberty and the idea of a Manifest Destiny that needs to be accomplished. American Man, as its predecessor and still companion European Man, are unified under an even more abstract concept, Imperial Man. Imperial gestures and types of behavior are certainly not unique to Europe or "America." A radical critique and denunciation of Latin American Man, and of ethno-class continental Man in general, is what I aim at in my critique. "Man," refers here to an ideal of humanity, and not to concrete human beings. It is that ideal which must die in order for the human to be born.

It should be clear, that I am talking here about epistemological and semiotic struggle, which takes the form of critical analysis and the invention and sharing of ideas that allow humans to preserve their humanity. A subversive act is that which help us to deflate imperial and continental concepts of Man, such as, for instance, referring to "Americans" in a way that designates their own particular provinciality rather than by a concept through which they appropriate the whole extent of the so-called "New World." That is what I mean to do by using "estadounidense" instead of American to refer

to the citizens of the United States. "Estadounidense" should be one of the first words that U.S. Americans learn from Spanish. It would avoid many misunderstandings. "Estadounidense" could be considered a *gift* from Spanish and Hispanic culture to the Anglo Saxon Protestant culture that Huntington reifies and seeks to protect. As I have argued elsewhere, unfortunately, receptivity and hospitality are two fundamental modes of humanity that those who occupy and assume the position of Master most resist. The reception of decolonizing gifts is the ultimate test for determining the presence of coloniality. In Huntington's text preservation acquires primacy over reception. Evasion of accountability and commitment with coloniality cannot be justified by conservative arguments that seek to preserve culture. Quite the contrary, to paraphrase a Kantian maxim about the relation between religion and reason, preservation can be justified within the limits of decolonization alone. And decolonization is hardly to be found in either Žižek or Huntington's texts.

Žižek and Huntington criticize multiculturalism and other expressions of decolonizing movements that found expression in the 1960's. They focused on the more ambivalently and less consistently decolonial expressions found in liberal multiculturalism and identity politics. They don't examine the extent to which many of the struggles of the sixties and their outcomes have put into question imperial conceptions of the human. They have partly done so by going against the grain from within but also by proposing alternative futures, utopias, or ways of being human. Fanon referred to colonized and racialized peoples as the *damnés*

or condemned of the earth. Following Fanon, Sylvia Wynter proposed the category of the *damné* to refer to the liminal subjects of Western modernity, including many of those subjects who rebelled in the sixties.[27] I will now clarify the concept of the *damné* and articulate the alternative ideal of being human to which it refers. The *damnés*, different from the people, the proletariat, or the multitude, can be taken as the primordial object of Decolonial Studies and Transmodern Perspectives.

The *damné* is not only a victim. The *damné* is a category that enunciates the condition of subjects who are locked in a position of subordination. The *damné* lives in a hell from which quite literally there is no escape. When history passes and the dialectic advances the *damnés* usually remain as recipients of still new orders of injustice, degradation, dehumanization, and suffering. The *damné* is, as it were, a liminal subject at the second or third degree. It is often the liminal of the liminal or the almost permanently liminal subject. From her perspective the dialectic seems almost frozen. In the far side of oppression, domination, and coloniality there is thus no such thing as a dialectic of the subaltern. What begins to emerge at the extreme point of irritation, frustration, and desire for conceptual and material transformation is a renewed sense of agency that seeks *an-other* understanding of the human.[28] This is the meaning that I propose for Fanon's often misunderstood words:

> Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of everyone of their streets, in all the corners of the globe…. So, my brothers, how is it that we do not understand that we have better things to do

> than to follow that same Europe?…. For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man."[29]

Fanon proposes post-colonial agency as an antidote to the Non-dialectics of Damnation. The concept of agency that Fanon proposes is intrinsically tied to the confrontation with the realities of damnation. That is to say, what stands as the background of his conception of agency is not the achievement of a modern bourgeois or socialist revolution or the ethereal insights of any given classical text in political theory. What informs his understanding of agency is an acute perception of coloniality and what is needed to overcome its pernicious effects.[30]

As Fanon's work suggest, and as the very etymology of the term *damné* makes clear, the damned is the one who wants to give but who can't give because what he possesses has been taken from him.[31] The *damnés* are the subjects who by virtue of their gender or skin colour are not seen as subjects who can participate in generous intersubjective contact with others. Fanon's characterization of the *damné* includes not only systematic and long-standing dehumanization, but also a particular kind of desire to establish generous human contact. In her most consistent attempts to elevate herself beyond the struggle for recognition that takes place within the dialectics of lordship and bondsman, the colonized, wretched or condemned, engages in a struggle for non-sexist human fraternity that involves, both self-critique and an ethics of receptive generosity.[32] When Fanon referred to the colonized as the *damné* he was not only describing a situation but also raising a challenge to colonized subjects.

This challenge was to set afoot a new ideal of the human, one that would take us beyond the limits of modernity/coloniality as incarnated in its European expressions and elsewhere.

For Fanon it was clear that the utopia of the colonized would remain within the horizons of modernity/coloniality and its masculine charged ethno-class conception of the human if it were based on rights of possession. Beyond obtaining property rights or social equality the utopia of the *damné* consists in giving birth to a world where human subjects could give themselves as who they are to others while others would recognize them as givers. The *damné* does not merely desire to possess (to have or to be), but to give and receive as well. Fanon pointed out that what the master resists most is not a formal recognition of rights or the equal division of property. Concession of property rights does not end racism. What the master resists most is to recognize the slave as someone who can give something to him. This alone challenges his status as absolute owner and absolute giver. The radical suspension of this privilege is what I have in mind when I call for the Death of Imperial Man, both in its European and American expressions. Calling for the Death of European and American Man means to divorce ourselves from the ideas, feelings, and actions that inhibit the generous transaction of gifts. This is a call to engage in a praxis of liberation which is also an ethics of risk and of generous encounter articulated from the position of the *damné*. Against the utopia of neo-liberalism, which functions as a reification of economism to the point of making authentic livelihood a

constant preparation for a war against terror, it is possible to conceive and fight for a non-imperial, non-sexist, and non-racist way of engaging with different subjects, with different cultures, and with different ways of thinking. The "negative intellectual" should be opposed by a "decolonizing intellectual," by someone who is "neither patriot nor universal cosmopolitan" and who promotes epistemic and cultural decolonization.[33] This "decolonizing intellectual" must be ready to engage in a project of epistemic and material decolonization that cannot be limited to the standards or viewpoints of the Parisians of 1968. The task is particularly difficult now, since the U.S. mainland has been attacked. Many "estadounidenses" relate the current events to Pearl Harbor and not to Vietnam. They are thirst for revenge and armed conflict. It is thus probably harder today than it was in the sixties to oppose the war machine. This is all the more so as the left turns every time more to the right, as both right and left insist on their typical Eurocentric monolingualism, and as those on the right use nationalist discourses, flags, and the menace of terror to justify a policy of *ideological pre-emptive strikes*. The monolingual Eurocentric left becomes complicit with this policy when it is only willing to find alternatives in text of classical political theory and when it assumes that non-Western, non-Christian, and subaltern responses to liberalism and the modern episteme can never escape fundamentalism or vicious forms of identity politics. The fight is thus difficult, but it must be fought. The decolonizing intellectual must learn how to fight it in solidarity with those whose voices have been occluded by the

modern episteme and by the more recent terrorist discourse against fundamentalism and terror. The decolonizing intellectual must be able to formulate alternatives utopias and find sources of hope in the midst of war.

Notes

1. See Nelson Maldonado Torres, "The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: Modernity, Empire, Coloniality," *City* 8, no. 1 (2004): 44. For articulations of the concept of damné see Nelson Maldonado Torres, "From Vietnam to Afghanistan, or Searching for Utopia in the Midst of War," [Rio de Janeiro (Brazil): Educam, 2003]. An account of the similarities and contrasts between the concepts of dasein, damné, people, and multitude is forthcoming in Nelson Maldonado Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being," in *Coloniality, Transmodernity, and Border Thinking*, ed. Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and José David Saldívar (forthcoming).
2. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
3. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies," in *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years*, ed. Noam Chomsky *et. al*. (New York: The New Press, 1997), 15-232.
4. Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
5. Walter Mignolo, "La Retórica de la Modernidad y la Lógica de la Colonialidad," in *Coloniality, Transmodernity, and Border Thinking*, ed. Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and José David Saldívar (proyectado a publicarse en el 2004).
6. Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America," *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 1, n. 3 (2000): 533-80.
7. Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science*.

8. This section is based on Nelson Maldonado Torres, "The Regressive Kernel of Orthodoxy. A Review of Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*," *Radical Philosophy Review*, v. 6, n. 1 (2003), Maldonado Torres, "Topology of Being."
9. See the chapter "The 'Thrilling Romance of Orthodoxy'," in Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 34-57. Žižek's views on orthodoxy are related to his conversations with John Milbank and other thinkers of the radical orthodoxy project. For a general view on the project of radical orthodoxy see John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology* (London: Routledge, 1999).
10. In the United States it has been more patriotism, than Christianity itself, which has served as the bedrock for pragmatist liberalists of leftist leanings like Richard Rorty and Cornel West. See particularly Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), Cornel West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism* (Madison, Wisc.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). I critically analyze these trends in "Toward a Critique of Continental Reason" (forthcoming in *Companion to African-American Studies*, Blackwell, 2004).
11. See, especially, Slavoj Žižek, *The Fragile Absolute or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting for?* (London: Verso, 2000), and Slavoj Žižek, "A Leftist Plea for 'Eurocentrism'," *Critical Inquiry,* n. 24 (1998).
12. Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 6. This thesis complements ideas that Žižek had already explored in "The Politics of Truth, or Alain Badiou as Reader of Paul," *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (London: Verso, 1999), 127-70.
13. Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 33.
14. Žižek writes "[T]rue monotheists are tolerant: for them, others are not objects of hatred, but simply people who, although they are not enlightened by the true belief, should nonetheless be respected, sin-

ce they are not inherently evil" (Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 27).

15. Žižek's double standard concerning his critique of the "Orient" and the soft treatments of figures like Hegel become clear in reflections on Zen Buddhism in *The Puppet and the Dwarf* and his defense of Hegel in Slavoj Žižek, "I Plead Guilty—But Where is the Judgment?," *Nepantla: Views from South*, n. 3 (2002). See also William D. Hart's critical engagements with Žižek in William D. Hart, "Slavoj Žižek and the Imperial/Colonial Model of Religion," *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 3, n. 3 (2002). See also Hart's rejoinder in William D. Hart, "Can a Judgment be Read? A Response to Žižek," *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 4, n. 1 (2003).
16. Portions of this analysis are forthcoming in the newsletter of the Center for Latino Policy Research at the University of California, Berkeley.
17. See Wallerstein, "The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies."
18. David Montejano, "Patriotic Reading for Anglo-Saxon Protestants." Forthcoming in *The Texas Observer*.
19. Wallerstein, "The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies," 227.
20. Vijay Prashad, "Confronting the Evangelical Imperialists," *Counterpunch* (consulted on September 15, 2004), 2003.
21. I owe the idea of decolonial studies to my colleague Laura Pérez. For reflections on transmodernity see Enrique Dussel, "Modernity, Eurocentrism, and Trans-Modernity: In Dialogue with Charles Taylor," in *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1996), Enrique Dussel, "World System and 'Trans'-Modernity," *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 3, n. 2 (2002).
22. See Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands — La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1991).
23. Ramón Grosfoguel used this term in the call for papers for the conference Latin@s in the World-System at UC-Berkeley (April 21-3, 2004).

24. Figuring out the meaning and possibilities of the decolonization of the United States is one of the main topics in the forthcoming anthology, *Latin@s in the World System*, ed. Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and José David Saldívar. The anthology is based on a conference with the same title that took place at the University of California, Berkeley on April 21-3, 2004.
25. A previous less extensive version of this part appears in Maldonado Torres, "From Vietnam to Afghanistan, or Searching for Utopia in the Midst of War."
26. Nelson Maldonado Torres, "Post-Imperial Reflections on Crisis, Knowledge, and Utopia: Transgresstopic Critical Hermeneutics and the 'Death of European Man'," *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations*, v. 25, n. 3 (2002).
27. See Paget Henry, *Caliban's Reason*, 136. Henry's discussion is based on a paper that Wynter delivered at Wellesley College: "After the New Class: James, *les damnés* and the Autonomy of Human Cognition" (April 19-21, 1991).
28. I follow Walter Mignolo in giving the adjective "an-other" both the sense of disruption from the genealogy of European thought and the opening to a diversity of views that emerge from the perspectives of histories marked by the colonial experience. The difference between what Mignolo refers to as "an-other paradigm" and a genealogy of critical movements and thought like the one proposed by Watts is evinced in that while for Watts the political thinking of the Zapatista movement is explained by tracing it back to Paris, Mignolo interprets it in the context of similar uprisings by colonized peoples, like those of many indigenous movements in South America and other struggles in Africa, the United States, and elsewhere. Mignolo does not argue that the Zapatista uprising is not related to Paris in any way. His point is rather that the coordinates of the movement are best explained in relation to struggles that do not assume Paris as their center. See Walter Mignolo "Prefacio a la edición castellana. Un 'Paradigma Otro': Colonialidad Global, Pensamiento Fronterizo y Cosmopolitanismo Crítico" (Preface to the Spanish

edition. "An-other paradigm:" global coloniality, border thinking, and criticial cosmopolitanism), *Historias Locales/Diseżos Globales: Colonialidad, Conocimientos Subalternos y Pensamiento Fronterizo*, trans. Juan María Madariaga y Cristina Vega Solís (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 2003), 22. For a more comprehensive analysis of the Zapatista movement see Walter Mignolo "The Zapatista's Theoretical Revolution: Its Historical, Ethical, and Political Consequences," *Review,* v. 25, n. 3 (2002): 245-75. For an expanded exposition of some of the main arguments in these essays see Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

29. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 311-12, 316.
30. The following exposition is based on the fourth chapter of my doctoral dissertation entitled "Recognition from Below: The Meaning of the Cry and the Gift of the Self in the Struggle for Recognition." See Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "Thinking from the Limits of Being: Lévinas, Fanon, Dussel and the Cry of Ethical Revolt," Ph.D. Diss., Brown University, May 2002, 155-213. A brief version of the argument appears in Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "The Cry of the Self as a Call from the Other: The Paradoxical Loving Subjectivity of Frantz Fanon," *Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture*, v. 36, n. 1 (2001): 46-60.
31. See Emile Benveniste, "Gift and Exchange in the Indo-European Vocabulary," In *The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity*, edited by Alan D. Schrift, translated by Mary Elisabeth Meek (New York: Routledge, 1997), 33-42.
32. For an elegant and creative exposition and analysis of the ethics of reciprocity see Romand Coles, *Rethinking Generosity: Critical Theory and the Politics of Caritas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). For a development of these ideas in connection with the work of feminists of colour see Romand Coles "Contesting Cosmopolitan Currencies: The Nepantlist Rose in the Cross(ing) of the Present," *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 4, n. 1 (2003), 5-40.

Important in this regard is also Chela Sandoval, *Methodology of the Oppressed.*

33. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Neither Patriotism nor Cosmopolitanism," in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).